A Comparison of American and British Offshore Oil Development during the Reagan and Thatcher Administrations--Part I by Vass, Uisdean R.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 21 Issue 1 
Fall 1985 
A Comparison of American and British Offshore Oil Development 
during the Reagan and Thatcher Administrations--Part I 
Uisdean R. Vass 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Uisdean R. Vass, A Comparison of American and British Offshore Oil Development during the Reagan and 
Thatcher Administrations--Part I, 21 Tulsa L. J. 23 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol21/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
A COMPARISON OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH
OFFSHORE OIL DEVELOPMENT DURING





I. THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN PRIVATE AND
GOVERNMENTAL MINERAL OWNERS ..................... 26
A. The Private Mineral Owner ........................... 27
B. The Governmental Mineral Owner ..................... 29
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN OFFSHORE OIL LAW.. 33
A. Early Trends ......................................... 33
1. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 ................ 36
2. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 ... 37
B. Environmental Statutes ............................... 38
1. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ... 39
2. The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 ....... 40
3. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 .............. 41
4. Miscellaneous Environmental Statutes ............. 42
C. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of
1978 ................................................. 43
1. National Policy ................................... 45
2. Authority ........................................ 45
3. The Five-Year Leasing Program ................... 46
* Winning essay of the Ninth Annual National Energy Law and Policy Institute Essay
Competition.
** The essay has been divided into two parts because of its length. Part II of the essay will
therefore appear in the Winter 1985 issue of the TULSA LAW JouRNAL.
*** Drummond & Co., W.S., Edinburgh, Scotland; LL.B. (Honours), D.I.L.P., University of
Edinburgh; LL.M., Louisiana State University; Member of the Louisiana Bar.
1
Vass: A Comparison of American and British Offshore Oil Development dur
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1985
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
4. The Leasing System ............................... 48
5. The New Bidding System ......................... 50
6. Exploration and Development Plans ............... 51
7. The Information Programs ........................ 52
8. The Compensation Funds ......................... 53
9. Federal Controls over the Disposition of
Hydrocarbons .................................... 54
D. Post-OCSLAA Developments .......................... 54
III. AMERICAN OFFSHORE OIL DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ............................... 57
A. Industry's Perspective ................................. 58
B. The New Offshore Regime ............................. 59
C. The Watt Plan and Associated Policies ................. 60
1. The Number of Lease Sales and Their Location .... 61
2. The Areawide Concept, Telescoping, and Their
Ramifications ..................................... 62
3. The Bidding System Under the OCSLAA ......... 66
a. The cash bonus bid ............................ 68
b. The royalty bid ................................ 69
c. The profit share bid ............................ 70
d. The work commitment bid ..................... 70
4. The Watt Bidding Strategy ........................ 71
a. Joint bidding .................................. 71
b. The large increase in acreage available .......... 72
5. The New System of Tract Evaluation .............. 73
D. Objections to the Five-Year Plan ....................... 75
E. The Effect of the Environmental Statutes on the Watt
Plan ................................................. 78
F. Important Legislative Developments and Issues ......... 84
G. A New Secretary and Some Changes .................. 88
INTRODUCTION
Oil is one of the most precious commodities in the modem world.
Immense hydrocarbon reserves lie in the seabed and subsoil off the
shores of the United States of America and the United Kingdom. The
federal government of the United States has natural resources jurisdic-
tion over about one billion acres of ocean floor adjacent to the three-mile
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territorial sea.1 Coastal states of the Union have the right to exploit oil
and gas deposits in the territorial sea washing their shorelines.2 The area
of federal jurisdiction, known as the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), is
estimated to contain forty-four billion barrels of oil and 231 trillion cubic
feet of gas.' Worth two trillion dollars at current prices, these resources
could run sixty-five million cars and heat twenty-three million homes for
fifty years.' The much smaller United Kingdom Continental Shelf
(UKCS) is also a valuable oil province. An official estimate puts recover-
able reserves at between thirteen to thirty billion barrels of oil, and 1025
to 1700 billion cubic feet of gas.'
This essay is an analysis and comparison of the goals and policies of
the law relating to offshore oil in the United States and the United King-
dom during the Reagan and Thatcher administrations. There are strong
similarities and connections between both countries. Both countries
share a common language and democratic institutions, and both coun-
tries are major economic and military partners. Most American whites
have roots in the nations of the United Kingdom. The English common
law is the basis of the laws of all but one of the states of the Union. Both
countries are leading industrial powers, and, unlike most of their West-
ern allies, they are oil producers as well as oil consumers. There is also a
more immediate political likeness. The Republican administration of
Mr. Ronald Reagan and the Conservative government of Mrs. Margaret
Thatcher share a common belief in a free enterprise-based society with
minimal governmental intervention in the economy.
Bearing in mind the above, one might expect to find strong parallels
in energy policy and, therefore, in offshore oil law. Strong parallels there
are, but there are also striking differences. The respective governments
have inherited different political, economic, and legal situations. They
govern in the context of differing institutions and pressures. It will be
shown that United Kingdom objectives have tended to involve policy
contradictions. American goals have been more harmonious, but have
met with significant opposition. Because of a lack of opposition in the
1. AM. PET. INST., SHOULD OFFSHORE OIL BE PUT OFF LIMITS? 44 (1984).
2. See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
3. Consideration of Legislation to Restrict the Department of the Interior's Oil and Gas Leasing
Program on the Outer Continental Shelf. Before the Subcomm. on Mining, Forest Management, and
Bonneville Power Administration of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 98th Cong., Ist
Sess. 900 (1984) (statement of J.J. Simmons III, Under Secretary, Dep't of the Interior) [hereinafter
cited as Consideration of Legislation].
4. Id.
5. UNITED KINGDOM DEP'T OF ENERGY, DEVELOPMENT OF THE OIL AND GAS RESOURCES
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1983, at 1 (1984).
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United Kingdom and a recent rearranging of priorities, it will be sug-
gested that British oil policy has ultimately been more successful.
Part I of the essay will begin with a brief theoretical discussion of
the goals that governments can pursue in relation to oil resources. The
second section will chart America's economic and social history as an oil
producer, and the development of its offshore oil laws up until 1980. The
third section will examine the Reagan administration's OCS energy poli-
cies and how the implementation of these policies has affected and
changed the law. Part II of the essay will begin with Section Four, which
will outline the United Kingdom's recent oil-producing history and the
laws which governed UKCS operations up until 1979. The fifth section
will analyse Conservative oil strategy and its impact on law and adminis-
trative decision-making. The final section will conclude the analysis and
comparison by summing up the goals and the differing levels of success of
both systems. Recommendations which assume the continuation of pres-
ent policies will also be submitted. It is believed that these recommenda-
tions will help to facilitate the further success of each government's
announced goals.
Finally, it should be noted that this essay concentrates on oil. De-
spite the fact that natural gas is often found in the same reservoirs as oil,
it has been accorded very different treatment in both the United States
and the United Kingdom. Comparative natural gas law is a subject
whose volume and complexity merits a separate study of its own.
I. THE DIsTINcTIoNs BETWEEN PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENTAL
MINERAL OWNERS
At first glance it might be thought that the government of a country
with ten billion barrels of proven oil reserves is in a similar position, and
has similar interests, as an American owner of private oil and gas rights
with a reservoir of, for example, fifty thousand barrels.' However, while
the interests of private mineral owners are, on a much larger scale, also
the interests of governments, it will be argued that a government's per-
spective on oil resources is much wider and more complex. To facilitate
this inquiry, it will be necessary to begin by briefly describing the rela-
tionship between individual mineral owner and oil company in the
United States.
6. The United States is one of the very few countries which has not transferred all ownership
of oil and gas rights from private citizens to the state. See K. DAM, OIL RESOURCES: WHo GETS
WHAT HoW? 3 (1976).
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A. The Private Mineral Owner
There are three approaches that a private American mineral owner
can employ in the exploration and development of his oil. In the vast
majority of cases only one approach is practical.
First, the mineral owner could drill his own wells and sell his pro-
duction directly on the market. In theory this is the preferable approach.
The mineral owner would have every incentive to keep costs low and,
moreover, would be able to keep all of the profits. But the problem here
is that even the shallowest wells cannot be drilled without highly special-
ised skills and massive investment. Unless one is operating in proven
territory, the prospects for success are at best speculative. As Ely re-
marks, "[i]f you own a farm, and think there is oil under it, it is possible
you have enough savings to pay the cost of drilling a wildcat well. But, if
you do, the statistical chances are something like forty to one that you
will not find oil, and will soon be in neither the oil business nor the farm-
ing business."7
Second, the mineral owner could hire drilling companies to do the
work for him for a fixed contractual fee and/or a share in the mineral
rights. Often called a "farm-out," this type of transaction is typically
used where an oil company holds a lease interest, but does not want to
drill any wells itself. Again, a private owner could rarely afford the fees
necessary for a hiring arrangement likely to be more costly, and just as
risky, as the first alternative.
Accordingly, the only practical option left to mineral owners who
are not themselves oil companies or millionaires is to lease their mineral
interests out to oil companies.8 Unlike many other lessor-lessee relation-
ships (for example, landlord-tenant), the lessee in the oil and gas lease
has the dominant bargaining position.9 The lessor's only negotiating lev-
erage arises from the fact that he owns the exclusive right to develop any
hydrocarbons which may underlie his property. The lessee, who may be
an Exxon or a Shell, has the finances, equipment, and expertise to extract
the oil and gas and will, in most cases, already hold large areas of mineral
lease acreage.
In his analysis of the Louisiana Mineral Code, McCollam describes
7. Ely, Trends in National Petroleum and Mining Laws, in THE ROLE OF NATIONAL Gov-
ERNMENTS IN EXPLORATION FOR MINERAL RESOURCES 21 (Bonini, Hedberg, & Kalliakoski eds.
1963) (a collection of papers presented at the 55th meeting of the Princeton University Conference).
8. Id.
9. See Donohoe, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases and Conservation Practice, 33 INsT.
ON OIL & GAs L. & TAX'N 97, 98 (1982).
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the structure of the typical oil and gas lease.' ° The lessee will usually
obtain his lease by the payment of an up-front "bonus," which is re-
garded as being the cost of the lease. Conceptually, an oil and gas lease is
divided into two periods: the "primary" and "secondary" terms. During
the primary term (usually from three to five years), the lease can be kept
alive either by production or good faith operations, or by the payment of
periodic delay rentals. However, there must generally be production in
paying quantities for the lease to continue into the secondary term. The
lease will invariably confer the exclusive right to explore for and develop
hydrocarbons in the acreage covered by the grant. If the lessee finds oil
or gas, he will then pay the lessor a royalty, usually one-eighth of
production."
The effect of the normal oil and gas lease is to assign to the lessee the
costs, the risks, and the lion's share of the rewards (if there are any)
arising from exploration and development. The lessor contributes noth-
ing to the oil operations on his land. The royalty he receives is his eco-
nomic rent. The price he pays for this arrangement is the fact that the
lease excludes him from the seventh-eighths of the hydrocarbons which
could theoretically be his under the first two alternatives.
The lessor's main interests in the mineral lease relationship are four-
fold. First, the lessor will wish to maximise revenue. The lessor entered
into the oil and gas lease to get a share in oil wealth which he could not
otherwise obtain. Having waived his own right to produce his oil and
gas, he will naturally want the largest possible share of the revenues that
someone else is making from his reserves. Second, the lessor will want to
maximise production. In almost all cases the maximisation of produc-
tion is, for the lessor, equivalent to the maximisation of revenue. The
lessor's royalty quantifiably increases with each extra barrel of oil pro-
duced. Third, the lessor will attempt to determine the extent of his
reserves by maximising exploration. Finally, while the lessor will desire
a comprehensive program of exploration and development of his re-
sources, he will also be anxious to limit the damage done by oil opera-
tions to the surface of his land, where, for example, he may live, fish, or
farm.
10. McCollam, A Primer for the Practice of Mineral Law under the New Louisiana Mineral
Code, 50 TUL. L. REv. 732, 782-83 (1976).
11. There are now a number of standard oil and gas leases which are used very widely. Almost
all conform to the general description of terms given in the text. See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE
OIL & GAS LEASE 51-153 (J. Lowe & K. Myles eds. 1985).
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B. The Governmental Mineral Owner
The first step necessary in comparing a government's position with
that of a private owner of oil and gas rights is to elucidate the differing
economic identities of the two parties. The private mineral owner is an
individual in a microeconomic context seeking to boost the net economic
benefits flowing to him from his resources. The government, however, is
a trustee in a macroeconomic context seeking to efficiently discharge the
responsibilities it has to the many groups in society who are its benefi-
ciaries. One cannot judge the performance of a private trustee till one
ascertains the purpose of the trust, the beneficiaries, the resources in-
volved, and the nature of the relevant economic situation. It is similarly
impossible to analyse a government's oil and gas policy till one gains
some understanding of the varied and often conflicting desiderata and
pressures which influence energy decision-makers. In the free world,
large sections of the business community profit directly from the produc-
tion of oil, while still larger sections of the business community are fueled
by its consumption. The responsibilities of the governments of oil-pro-
ducing states are weighty and multifarious; a private lessor, on the other
hand, has no responsibility other than to obtain the best terms for
himself.
The oil and gas lease is the sole measure of the relationship between
lessor and lessee. The lessor as landowner bargains in a purely proprie-
tary capacity, since wider social and economic considerations play no
part in the transaction. Where the government owns the oil and gas it
also bargains in a proprietary capacity. Yet it does not act in a purely
proprietary capacity, for government is a regulator as well as a land-
owner.12 Thus in the absence of constitutional obstacles, the govern-
ment, unlike the private lessor, can vary the contractual relationship to
take into account changing social and economic conditions. 3 But in
12. In the context of the United States this double role of government is explained by Christo-
pher in these terms:
When the United States leases its lands for minerals, it occupies a troublesome dual capac-
ity. In its proprietary capacity, the Government is like any other lessor, bargaining hard
for the best lease terms, but recognizing their binding effect as a contract once they are
agreed upon. However, in its governmental capacity, the United States as a sovereign has a
continuing responsibility to exercise police powers, particularly those relating to conserva-
tion, over the land leased.
Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New Frontier, 6 STAN. L. REV. 23,
43-44 (1953).
13. The Chairman of Shell Chemicals UK, W.C. Thomson, commented in 1976 that "[tihe
rules today are what governments say they are, and they may be changed tomorrow." Petroleum
Times, July 9, 1976, at 3, col. 2, reprinted in D. KETO, LAW AND OFFSHORE OIL DEVELOPMENT:
THE NORTH SEA EXPERIENCE 14 (1978).
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exercising its discretion to change operating conditions, the government
takes the risk that private enterprise may quit the development of the
resources.
It was previously noted that a private mineral owner usually lacks
the capital and expertise to personally develop his oil reserves, and also
lacks the capital to hire someone to do the job. His only practical option
is to lease his mineral rights to private enterprise. Therefore, in the lease
relationship the private mineral owner is typically in the weaker bargain-
ing position. Governments are also faced with the three basic alterna-
tives available to the private mineral owner. Normally, however,
governments are not in such a weak position as the mineral owner, since
part of a government's total revenue may be used to finance oil and gas
exploration and development. While oil companies can easily afford to
refuse to negotiate with a hard-bargaining lessor, they cannot so afford to
be excluded from whole nations, especially if there are substantial oil
deposits in any such given country.14 On the other hand, few govern-
ments are either able or willing to commit the enormous quantities of
capital required to support a purely state-run oil industry. Only in com-
paratively few countries, and then for mainly ideological reasons, do gov-
ernments choose to develop hydrocarbon wealth without assistance from
the private sector. 15
In macroeconomic terms it is important to see the three methods of
development as a type of spectrum. This spectrum charts the degree of
government participation in oil exploration and development. State in-
volvement is maximised in alternative one and minimised in alternative
three. The alternatives are also economic models. A government need
not necessarily chose one or either model. Most oil-producing states use
facets of the various systems which they consider appropriate. A com-
munist country like the People's Republic of China, for example, having
neither the capital nor the expertise to properly develop its hydrocarbons
in the South China Sea, has lately been giving licences to multinational
oil companies to explore and develop that area. Western nations believe,
to a lesser or greater degree, in the benefits of free market economics.
Yet Norway relies on its state oil company, Staatoil, to play a leading
14. Daintith points out that "[b]oth the need for change, and the capacity to effect it, are likely
to be less in states where small or insignificant discoveries have been made." Daintith, Petroleum
Licences: A Comparative Introduction, in THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF PETROLEUM LICENCES: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 7 (T. Daintith ed. 1981).
15. For an interesting discussion of the problems of state financed oil and gas activity, see Ely,
supra note 7, at 20.
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role in the exploration of its reserves in the North Sea and North Atlan-
tic. In this instance, Norway is using both state participation and private
enterprise in its economic exploration and development model.
An investigation will now be undertaken of the main goals that a
government may pursue with respect to oil reserves. This is not intended
to be an exhaustive analysis of the goals; it is merely an introduction.
Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom have developed their
resources purely by means of a nationalised oil company. For the pur-
poses of this analysis it is assumed that the hypothetical government has
permitted substantial private enterprise participation.16
Since oil is a scarce and valuable resource, a government will often
wish to maximise production to obtain self-sufficiency. This may have
the effect of freeing it from reliance on potentially unstable foreign
sources. Since it would have to buy foreign oil if it did not produce its
own, the maximisation of production is also very useful in helping with
balance of payments problems. Another reason for maximising produc-
tion may be to lower the price of oil. This has the effect of lowering
energy costs and making the whole economy more competitive.
To a government, the maximisation of production is only equivalent
to the maximisation of revenue if production increases with no decrease
in royalty or tax rates. A government will often attempt to increase oil
revenues by raising the royalty or tax rate. Because overall costs will
therefore be higher, a drop in the rate of oil production tends to result.
Conversely, when a government wants to increase exploration, develop-
ment, and production, it will often cut royalties and taxes. Obviously,
the fact that a government is a regulator as well as a landowner means
that the economics of production and revenue raising differ from the eco-
nomics of the mineral owner who happens to be a private entity. A gov-
ernment may wish to maximise revenue for as many reasons as there are
items on its public expenditure list.' 7 Frequently, there is often a strong
desire to create or rebuild other sectors of the economy with oil
revenues. 18
16. Keto, in his analysis of the various national goals relating to the North Sea development of
the 1960's and 1970's, mentions six main objectives: (1) security of domestic oil supply, (2) public
national revenues, (3) private national revenues, (4) safety, (5) social and economic stability, (6) envi-
ronmental quality. D. KETO, supra note 13, at 47.
17. As Keto observes, "[it is a rare government that does not have difficulty balancing its
budget." D. KETO, supra note 13, at 48.
18. For example, the idea of using UKCS revenues to bolster sections of the British economy
has gained wide support among both businessmen and labor unions in the United Kingdom. See
Williams, Frittering Away the North Sea's Riches, The Times (London), Dec. 14, 1981, at 15, col. 1.
1985]
9
Vass: A Comparison of American and British Offshore Oil Development dur
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1985
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Oil is traded on a world market, and merely because a state is pro-
ducing oil does not necessarily mean that the oil is available to the mar-
kets of that state. The oil companies may be selling it abroad. Often a
government will desire to have controls which can, at least in an emer-
gency like an oil shortage or a war, ensure that the home-produced oil is
available for home markets. In the words of the mineral economist
Flawn, "[tlhe question of national security is perhaps more closely tied to
oil than to any other mineral commodity because of the essential nature
of this mineral fuel." 9
A government will seek to maximise direct economic benefit by en-
suring that its home economy is as involved as possible in the oil develop-
ments.2 ° Multinational oil companies, for example, can be encouraged to
place orders for rigs or other equipment with home based industries.
Many governments believe that the best way to exploit natural re-
sources is to rely heavily on the lease method, with free enterprise operat-
ing at its own risk and creating its own reward. Accordingly, the
government will attempt to maximise competition by providing that such
competition be as fair and free as possible.
Energy policy requires not only immediate, but also long-term plan-
ning. The desideratum of self-sufficiency must be measured against the
objective of continuing supply and the conservation of resources. Deple-
tion policy is sometimes used to conserve supply so that the oil may be
available for a longer period of time.2
It is also very desirable on economic and strategic grounds that a
government should have an accurate idea of the real extent of its
reserves. This necessitates a thorough program of exploration to inven-
tory resources.
Finally, neither the government nor the private mineral owner
wishes to see other economic activities or scenic beauty and the environ-
ment interfered with or damaged by oil operations.22 The government
has an additional interest, however, in its desire to provide for the safety
19. P. FLAWN, MINERAL RESOURCES: GEOLOGY, ENGINEERING, ECONOMICS, POLITICS,
LAW 202 (1966).
20. Keto remarks that all the nations bordering the North Sea have "shown a strong interest in
ensuring that national business enterprises, as opposed to foreign enterprises, receive the maximum
economic benefit from offshore development activities." D. KETo, supra note 13, at 49-50.
21. See P. FLAWN, supra note 19, at 183-95 (discussing the conservation concept).
22. In countries like Great Britain, the goal of environmental protection has been viewed as
secondary to the goal of economic development. See D. KETO, supra note 13, at 54-55.
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of its citizens who are employed in the oil industry.23
These are the main goals which governments pursue with regard to
oil development. Many of them are contradictory in nature. If, for ex-
ample, a government tries to maximise revenue, the rate of exploration
and production may fall. Similarly, should the major goal focus on
boosting production, then conceivably the environment may suffer. The
ensuing sections will investigate where the governments of Mr. Reagan
and Mrs. Thatcher have placed their priorities, the nature of the accom-
panying law, and the consequences.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN OFFSHORE OIL LAW
A. Early Trends
The United States oil industry began in 1859 when the Drake well
was drilled in Titusville, Pennsylvania.24 From this humble beginning
the industry grew to become the largest in the world. Oil was a major
factor in the huge American industrial expansion of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Dr. Paul H. Frankel refers to America in
this period as the "fountainhead of oil supplies."2 5 Not only was it a
major producer of oil, it was also a major exporter. In 1938 it was esti-
mated that the United States had 50.6% of the world's crude oil reserves,
and produced 3.3 million barrels a day, nearly sixty percent of the
world's production.26 By the late 1940's, however, America's standing as
an oil producer had, in comparative terms, declined due to the considera-
ble expansion of exploration and development in the Middle East. The
United States was still producing over half of the world's requirements,
but by the late 1940's the Arab countries were accredited as having more
reserves. By 1969 it was believed that the United States possessed only
seven percent of world reserves as against a figure of 61.6% for the Arab
countries.2 7 At that time, the Middle East was outproducing the United
States to the tune of about three million barrels a day.2 8 As the 1970's
dawned, America's economy was still the strongest on earth, but it was
23. See W. CARSON, THE OTHER PRICE OF BRITAIN'S OIL: SAFETY AND CONTROL IN THE
NORTH SEA (1981).
24. AM. PET. INST., Two ENERGY FUTURES: A NATIONAL CHOICE FOR THE 1980's, at 43
(1980).
25. Frankel, Structural Analysis of the International Oil Industry, in 1 INT'L B.A., PETROLEUM
LAW SEMINAR 1.5 (1978).
26. Lewis, Some Aspects of the International Oil Industry Since the Second World War, in 1
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slowly slipping into a state of dependency on foreign oil. In 1970 the
United States was twenty-three percent reliant on foreign oil imports,
29
and by 1976 the rate had risen to forty percent.30
Despite the huge volume of American oil production during much
of this century, the United States offshore areas had been, up until the
mid-1960's, but a marginal contributor to the overall energy picture.
Before charting the development of the offshore industry any further,
however, it is appropriate to deal with the ownership of oil and gas rights
in the waters off America's shores. Every nation has traditionally been
entitled under international law to a territorial sea skirting its coasts.31
Although there is no generally accepted limit to the width of this territo-
rial sea, in both the United States and the United Kingdom the limit is
three miles. 32 Nations have complete jurisdiction over their territorial
sea. Therefore, the United States and the United Kingdom own oil and
gas rights in their respective three-mile limit areas. Yet operations are
undertaken much farther offshore than three miles. The explanation for
this situation lies with the international law doctrine of the continental
shelf.
The continental shelf is both a geological concept and a legal doc-
trine. The geological continental shelf, along with the continental slope
and the continental rise, is a part of the submerged segment of the great
elevations which rise from the deep ocean floor to form the continents of
the world. Typically, the shelf declines gently away from the land mass,
the slope constitutes a sharp drop, and the rise runs gently down to the
abyssal plain or deep ocean floor.33
29. Shaffer, OCS Development and the Consistency Provisions of the Coastal Zone Management
Act-A Legal and Policy Analysis, 4 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 595, 604 (1977).
30. Id. at 605.
31. In 1911 Fulton wrote:
It is now settled as indisputable, both by the usage of nations and the principles of interna-
tional law, that the open ocean cannot be appropriated by any one Power. But it is also as
firmly established that all states possess sovereign rights in those parts of the sea which
wash their shores, although there is not, and has never been, universal agreement as to the
precise nature of these rights, or as to the extent of the sea that may be thus appropriated.
T. FULTON, THE SOVERIGNTY OF THE SEA 537 (1911), reprinted in H. KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE
SEA: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND READINGS 3.3 (1980). See generally O'Connell, The Juridical Na-
ture of the Territorial Sea, 45 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 303 (1971) (discussing the development of legal
doctrine concerned with the territorial sea).
32. For the common position of both the United States and the United Kingdom on this issue,
see Gormley, The Unilateral Extension of Territorial Waters: The Failure of the United Nations to
Protect Freedom of the Seas, 43 U. DET. L.J. 695, 711-13 (1966).
33. For an excellent short geologic description of the continental shelf, slope, and rise, see
Knight, The Draft United Nations Conventions on the International Seabed Area: Background, De-
scription, and Some Preliminary Thoughts, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 459, 463-70 (1971).
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The legal doctrine of the continental shelf was established by presi-
dential proclamation34 when, in 1945, President Harry Truman stated
that it was the policy of the United States to regard "the natural re-
sources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the
high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertain-
ing to the United States subject to its jurisdiction and control."35 This
unilateral claim purported to give the United States mineral jurisdiction
over very wide areas of the seabed and subsoil of the ocean beyond the
territorial sea.36 The Truman Proclamation was quickly followed by the
claims of many other countries to their continental shelf areas. In 1958
the international community met to codify the continental shelf regime.
The result was the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. Article
I of the Convention provides that "the term 'continental shelf'" refers
(a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea to a depth of 200 metres
or beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superadjacent waters
admits of the exploration of the natural resources of the said areas;
(b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the
coasts of islands.37
Both the United States and the United Kingdom were signatories. Thus
it is this continental shelf doctrine which ultimately gives the United
States the right to claim oil and gas rights in one billion acres of sea floor.
The first offshore wells in the history of the American oil industry
were drilled in the Santa Barbara Channel off California in the 1890's.
There were no developments in the Gulf of Mexico, America's main
present-day offshore oil province, till the 1930's.38 It was clear from
1945 that not only the territorial sea, but also the continental shelf, fell
broadly under American natural resources jurisdiction. It was by no
means obvious, however, whether it was the federal government, the
state governments, or a combination of both, who were to have the right
to develop the submarine hydrocarbons. United States v. California,39
34. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
35. Id.
36. For a discussion of the background to, and the effect of, the Truman Proclamation on the
Continental Shelf, see Hollick, US. Oceans Policy: The Truman Proclamations, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 23
(1976).
37. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578,
449 U.N.T.S. 311, 311.
38. Jones, The Legal Framework for Energy Development on the Outer Continental Shelf, 10
U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REv. 143, 147 (1981); Yudes, Coastal Zone Impacts of Offshore Oil and Gas
Development: An Accommodation Through the California Coastal Act of 1976, 8 PAC. L.J. 783, 793
(1977).
39. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
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decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1947, held that the fed-
eral government had sole rights to oil and gas in the three-mile territorial
sea.' United States v. Louisiana4 1 was litigated shortly thereafter in
1950. In that case, Louisiana claimed oil and gas rights not only in the
territorial sea, but also in a substantial part of the continental shelf.42
Mr. Justice Douglas reiterated the holding of United States v. California
and held in favor of the federal government both as to the territorial sea
and the continental shelf.'4 A similar result was reached the same year
in United States v. Texas.' Taken together, these three cases appeared to
constitute a complete victory for the federal government.
1. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953
Predictably, the coastal states felt that the Supreme Court had un-
justifiably held against them in the preceding litigation. Therefore, they
took their case to Congress. a" In 1953 Congress responded by passing
the Submerged Lands Act" (SLA). The SLA vests the states with own-
ership and the right to develop land under navigable waters in the state
and
all lands permanently or periodically covered by tidal waters ... to a
line three geographical miles distant from the coastline of each such
State and to the boundary line of each such State where in any case
such boundary as it existed at the time such State became a member of
the Union or as heretofore approved by Congress extends seaward (or
into the Gulf of Mexico) beyond three geographical miles.4 7
But in no case could such a limit extend further than three miles into the
Atlantic or Pacific, or for more than three marine leagues into the Gulf
40. See id. at 29-41.
41. 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
42. Id. at 702.
43. Id. at 704-06.
44. 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
45. The legislative history of the Submerged Lands Act sums up the position of the coastal
states:
The Federal Government has never, prior to 1937, asserted any right in the submerged
tidelands, has never enjoyed any rights, either in its sovereign or proprietary capacity over
such lands, but at all times, from the inception of the Government and prior to 1937,
acting through its executive agencies, recognized that unqualified ownership was in the
coastal States and that such States had full and complete sovereignty and dominion over
these lands, subject to the constitutional right of the Federal Government to regulate
commerce.
H.R. REP. No. 1778, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
1415, 1430.
46. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1982).
47. Id. § 1301(a)(2).
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of Mexico.4 8 This raised questions as to where the boundaries of the
Gulf states had been at the time they entered the Union, and whether
Congress had subsequently altered any of the boundaries. Subsequent
litigation established that the boundaries of Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama had always been three miles.' The Texas territorial sea was
found to have been three marine leagues wide when Texas entered the
Union,50 while Florida's territorial sea on the Gulf of Mexico side had
been reenacted as three marine leagues by Congress.5 A further contro-
versy, relating to Louisiana, has occurred over the exact position of that
state's shifting coastline.52 This issue is not capable of a definitive solu-
tion because Louisiana's coast erodes and accumulates very rapidly.
2. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953
The SLA resulted in the coastal states being given mineral jurisdic-
tion in marine areas three to ten miles from the shore. In these waters
the states can exploit oil and gas and other resources according to their
own goals and policies. But this essay is concerned with the development
of the rest of America's mineral offshore. This huge area, already re-
ferred to as the OCS, was made the responsibility of the federal govern-
ment by the SLA.53 In addition, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
of 195354 (OCSLA) delegated to the Secretary of the Interior the power
to conduct lease sales and administer oil and gas operations on the
OCS.55 The Secretary was directed to use either a cash bonus bid with
fixed royalty or a royalty bid with a fixed bonus bidding system when
leasing.56 But in general terms, the Department of the Interior (DOI)
was given very wide discretion in going about its duties. Potentially in-
terested parties like states and fishermen were given no statutory right to
be heard or to participate in decision-making.57 The OCSLA also appor-
48. Id. § 1301(b).
49. See United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960).
50. Id. at 36-64.
51. See United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960).
52. Considerable litigation, beginning with United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969), has
resulted from the federal-state dispute as to the positioning of Louisiana's coast. On June 16, 1975,
the Supreme Court, in a supplemental decree, established the boundaries of Louisiana's coastline.
See United States v. Louisiana, 422 U.S. 13 (1975).
53. 43 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982).
54. Id. §§ 1331-1343 (1982) (amended 1978).
55. Id. § 1341(a)(1) (1976).
56. Id. § 1337(a).
57. For an analysis of the lack of participation involved in the provisions of the OCSLA, see
Miron, The Outer Continental Shelf-Managing (or Mismanaging) its Resources, 2 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 267, 270-74 (1971).
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tioned the OCS between the coastal states for the purposes of determin-
ing the applicable law.58 An individual state's laws were to apply to that
part apportioned to it so long as the state law was not inconsistent with
federal law. 9 State taxation was never to apply to the OCS. °
The object of the OCSLA was to provide a legal basis for the devel-
opment of OCS resources. 1 The adopted leasing system relied entirely
on private enterprise to undertake the envisaged offshore exploration and
development. Because there was an abundance of cheap onshore oil dur-
ing the 1950's, there was relatively little mineral activity on the OCS
during that early period. 2 The federal offshore program was limited
exclusively to the Gulf of Mexico till the late 1960's, and almost all oper-
ations in that sector occurred in the OCS adjacent to Louisiana. By
1968, federal waters off of Louisiana's coast boasted 518 producing oil
and gas leases, as compared with ten off Texas and three off California. 63
These leases were the only producing leases in the OCS. Total federal
offshore oil and condensate production for that year was 268,996,000
barrels or eight percent of the total United States oil and condensate pro-
duction of 3,329,042,000 barrels.' 4
B. Environmental Statutes
Despite the concentration of operations off the Louisiana coast, it
was events in California which would leave long-lasting marks on the
American offshore oil industry. In March 1968 the Union Oil Company
discovered oil in the Santa Barbara Channel. On January 29, 1969, as
Platform A's fourth well was being completed, a blowout occurred.65
The spill was fairly large, involving the diffusion of about 3.25 million
58. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (1976).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Several helpful discussions of the various facets of the OCSLA can be found in Christopher,
supra note 12, at 23; Krueger, An Evaluation of the Provisions and Policies of the Outer Continental
Shelf Land Act, 10 NAT. RESOURCES J. 763 (1970); Miron, supra note 57, at 267; Montgomery, The
Multiple Use Concept As the Basis of a New Outer Continental Shelf Legislative Policy, 62 Ky. L.J.
327 (1974).
62. See Murphy & Belsky, OCS Development: A New Law and a New Beginning, 7 COASTAL
ZONE MGMT. J. 297, 300 (1980).
63. MINERALS MGMT. SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL OFFSHORE STATIS-
TIcs 20 (1984).
64. Id. at 91.
65. For further discussion of the Santa Barbara blowout, see Levine, The Santa Barbara Saga-
Pre and Post N.EP.A., 7 LINCOLN L. REV. 73 (1971); Nanda & Stiles, Offshore Oil Spills: An
Evaluation of Recent United States Responses, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 519 (1970); Walmsley, Oil
Pollution Problems Arising out of Exploitation of the Continental Shelf." The Santa Barbara Disaster, 9
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 514 (1972); Note, The Oil Men and the Sea: The Future of Ocean Resource
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gallons.66 Extensive short-term damage was caused to the surrounding
environment. But after about a year, no discernible environmental im-
pact attributable to the spill could be found by scientific analysis.67 The
main effect of the blowout was political in nature rather than biological.
Across the nation television screens were filled with reports of black, glu-
tinous oil flooding golden beaches and leaving a mass of dead or dying
birds in its wake. The incident at Santa Barbara was in large part re-
sponsible for the creation of the American environmentalist movement. 68
The environmentalists became, and remain, one of the most powerful
political lobbies in the United States. Their supporters in Congress
passed a number of highly significant measures designed to protect
America's people, countryside, and coasts from the adverse effects of in-
dustrial activity. Three of these measures are especially relevant for the
purposes of this study and are therefore briefly summarised below.
1. The National Environmental Policy Act of 196969 (NEPA)
This piece of legislation has often been referred to as "the Sherman
Act" of American environmental law. NEPA's most important provi-
sion, section 102(2)(c), 70 requires that an environmental analysis be un-
dertaken before a decision on any federal action "significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment" can be made.7 Such an analysis
is known as an environmental impact statement (EIS). In addition to
giving an estimate of the likely environmental impact, the EIS must con-
sider such issues as whether unavoidable adverse environmental effects
will be caused by the proposed course of action, whether there are alter-
native courses of action, and whether irretrievable and irreversible com-
mitments of resources will be involved in adopting the course of action.72
NEPA is an essentially procedural statute. If the EIS does not meet
the requirements set out in section 102, the decision in question can be
Development in Light of Santa Barbara-Some Proposals to Rectify Continuing Inadequate Federal
Regulation of Offshore Leasing, 11 Aiuz. L. REv. 677 (1969).
66. See Kaplan, California: Threatening the Golden Shore, in THE POLITICS OF OFFSHORE OIL
4 (J. Goldstein ed. 1982).
67. Id.
68. See Comment, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978. Balancing
Energy Needs with Environmental Concerns?, 40 LA. L. REv. 177, 181 (1979).
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982).
70. Id. § 4332.
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struck down as unlawful.7 3 But if the federal agency properly prepares
the EIS, it may then act as it desires subject to the broader concept of
judicial review of administrative action.
NEPA also created a Council on Environmental Quality74 (CEQ).
This body assists the President in the compilation of an Environmental
Quality Report which is annually submitted to Congress.75 It also helps
in the formulation of national environmental policy and has promulgated
regulations dealing with the EIS process which are binding on federal
agencies.76 CEQ regulations are to be accorded substantial deference by
the courts in the interpretation of NEPA.7 7
2. The Coastal Zone Management Act of 197278 (CZMA)
This statute was passed to encourage and provide the framework for
federally approved state Coastal Zone Management Programs
(CZMP) 7 9 Such programs were necessary, Congress reasoned, because
of increasing societal pressure on the coasts of America." The CZMA
was an attempt to facilitate state planning of future social, economic, and
environmental impacts on the shoreline.
The CZMA provides two major incentives for coastal states to pre-
pare coastal zone management plans and thereafter submit them to the
Secretary of Commerce for approval. First, any approved plan is eligible
for federal grants.81 Second, the states are given a participating role in
federal decisions relating to the coastal zone by the so-called "consis-
tency provisions." Section 307 of the CZMA provides that any federal
agency conducting or supporting activities which directly affect the
coastal zone in a state which has a federally approved coastal plan must
do so in a manner which is, to the maximum extent practicable, consis-
73. See generally W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 730-37 (1977) (exploring the various
EIS inadequacies that courts have found to be in violation of section 102).
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-4347 (1982).
75. Id. § 4344(1).
76. The CEQ's power to promulgate binding regulations relative to NEPA is not expressly
provided for in NEPA. But in 1977, President Carter decided to provide for a set of procedural
environmental regulations which would apply to all federal agencies and ordered the heads of federal
authorities to comply with CEQ regulations. Exec. Order No. 11,991, 3 C.F.R. 123 (1978), reprinted
in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 app. at 509 (1982) (amending Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 902 (1970)).
77. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1978).
78. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982).
79. S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4776, 4776.
80. See id. at 2-6, 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4776-81.
81. See 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (1982).
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tent with that plan.82 The same section further provides that any person
who submits an exploration or development plan with respect to an OCS
mineral lease to the Secretary of Interior for approval must, if such plan
would affect any land or water use in the coastal zone of a state having an
approved plan, attach to the plan a certification that the activities are
consistent with the state's plan, and that the activities will be carried out
in a manner consistent therewith. 83 The state or state agency must re-
ceive a copy of the exploration or development plan.84 The Secretary of
the Interior cannot approve such a plan till the state agrees that it fulfills
the consistency requirement, or the Secretary of Commerce approves the
plan as being consistent with the objectives of CZMA or is otherwise
necessary in the interest of national security.85
3. The Endangered Species Act of 197386 (ESA)
The ESA has as its objective the protection of endangered species of
wildlife.87 For the purposes of the ESA, an endangered species is desig-
nated as such by the Secretary of the Interior,"8 or, in certain circum-
stances, by the Secretary of Commerce.89 Substantive, as well as
procedural, guidelines are laid down by the ESA for all federal agencies.
Every federal agency must ensure that none of its actions are "likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
habitat of such species .. ". ."I' An intricate procedure to facilitate
compliance is included in the ESA9 ' and is expanded upon by further
regulations. If the federal agency fears that there may be a possibility of
jeopardizing an endangered species, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
82. Id. § 1456(c)(1).
83. Id. § 1456(c)(3)(B).
84. Id.
85. Id. § 1456(c)(3)(B)(i), (iii).
86. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982).
87. See S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2989, 2989-90. See generally Goplerud, The Endangered Species Act: Does it Jeopardize the
Continued Existence of Species?, 1979 ARiz. ST. L.J. 487; Rosenberg, Federal Protection of Unique
Environmental Interests: Endangered and Threatened Species, 58 N.C.L. REv. 491 (1980); Sim-
mons, The Endangered Species Act of 1973, 23 S.D.L. REv. 302 (1978); Comment, Promise and
Peril: A New Look at the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 27 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 959 (1983).
88. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6), (15) (1982).
89. The listing of certain migratory marine species of game fish is undertaken by the Secretary
of Commerce. See id. § 1533(a)(2); Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,627 (1970), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1138 (1982), and in 84 Stat. 2090 (1970); see also Comment, supra note 87, at
971-75 (describing listing procedures).
90. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982).
91. Id. § 1536(b), (c).
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or the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) may become involved
in a biological analysis of the likely effects of the proposed decision. 92
The particular species involved determines which service undertakes the
biological analysis. 93 If a threshold consultation by the service deter-
mines that the proposed action will jeopardize an endangered species, the
federal agency instituting the action will be advised of this finding.94
Should it be found that there is insufficient information to determine
whether a relevant species will be jeopardized, section 7(d) of the ESA
stipulates that the federal agency must not make, nor allow to be made,
any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources which might
prevent the formulation of alternative measures to avoid endangering a
species later.95 Because the ESA imposes substantive as well as proce-
dural duties on federal agencies, it is, within its own narrower scope, a
more powerful statute than NEPA.
4. Miscellaneous Environmental Statutes
There are several other important environmental statutes which
merit attention. The Clean Air Act96 gives authority to the Administra-
tor of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to prescribe national
ambient air quality standards.97 While the Clean Air Act makes no spe-
cific mention of its applicability beyond the territorial limits of the states,
the Administrator of the EPA has determined that the Act is applicable
"to the extent that the emission [from an OCS facility] may affect air
quality in a coastal state."98 The Marine Protection Research and Sanc-
tuaries Act99 gives the Secretary of Commerce the power, subject to a
requirement of consultation with the heads of other federal departments
and the approval of the President, to designate sections of the OCS or
92. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1984).
93. See id.
94. Id. § 402.04(e)(3).
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (1982); see 50 C.F.R. § 402.04(0 (1984).
96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982). See generally Hays, Clean Air: From the 1970 Act to the
1977 Amendments, 17 DUQ. L. REv. 33 (1978-79) (discussing the evolution of the amendments of
1977).
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (1982).
98. Comment, supra note 68, at 185.
99. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1434 (1982). See generally Epting, National Marine Sanctuary Program:
Balancing Resource Protection with Multiple Use, 18 Hous. L. REV. 1037 (1981); Hoagland, Federal
Ocean Resource Management Interagency Conflict and the Need for a Balanced Approach to Re-
source Management, 3 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1 (1983); Kifer, NOAA's Marine Sanctuary Pro-
gram, 2 CoAsrAL ZoNE MoMT. J. 177 (1975); Schenke, The Marine Protection, Research, and
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territorial sea as marine sanctuaries.l" ° After a marine sanctuary is cre-
ated, its future administration becomes the responsibility of the Secretary
of Commerce.10 1 Lastly, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act"0 2
provides that there shall be no discharges of oil or other hazardous sub-
stances into or on the navigable waters of the United States' territorial
sea, or in connection with oil and gas activities authorised by the
OCSLA.103
C. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978
In the autumn of 1973 the State of Israel was attacked by its Arab
neighbors. Generous assistance from the United States was instrumental
in enabling Israel to successfully resist the invasion. In retaliation, the
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) curtailed sup-
plies of oil to the United States."°4 As a reaction to the rocketing price of
petroleum, the Nixon administration declared self-sufficiency in energy
to be a national goal. 105 Project Independence, as it was called, involved
the leasing of ten million OCS acres for oil and gas in 1975 alone.10 6
Much of this acreage was located in the unexplored or frontier areas of
the American offshore. An ambitious plan, this drive to dramatically
increase oil and gas production was geared to complete United States
self-sufficiency by 1980. It proved impossible to carry out.
There were a number of reasons for the failure of this and other
plans to boost American offshore production in the 1970's. First, the
new environmental statutes, particularly NEPA, made the process of
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1982).
101. Id. § 1432(0.
102. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). See generally Baum, Legislating Cost-Benefit Analysis: The
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Experience, 9 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 75 (1983); Bermingham,
The Federal Government and Air and Water Pollution, 23 Bus. LAw. 467 (1968); Keener, Federal
Water Pollution Legislation and Regulations with Particular Reference to the Oil Industry, 4 NAT.
RESOURCES LAW. 484 (1971).
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (1982).
104. For an economic and international law analysis of the Arab oil boycott, see C. DORAN,
MYTH, OIL AND POLITICS 31-46 (1977); Boorman, Economic Coercion in International Law: The
Arab Oil Weapon and the Ensuing Juridical Issues, 9 J. INr'L LAW & ECON. 205 (1974); Muir, The
Boycott in International Law, 9 J. INT'L LAWv & ECON. 187 (1974).
105. See generally Gendler, Offshore Oil Power Plays: Maximizing State Input into Federal Re-
source Decision Making, 12 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 347 (1979); Jaidah, The United States' Energy
Situation: An OPEC View, 11 NAT. RESOURCES LAw. 617 (1978); Kesterman & Hay, Domestic
Offshore Drilling and U.S. Energy Options, 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 701 (1974); Williams, Oil and Gas
and the Federal Lands, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 507, 507-08.
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OCS oil and gas leasing more complex and drawn out 1 7 since an EIS
was required for every lease sale.108 The first post-NEPA OCS lease sale
was held in the Gulf of Mexico in November 1971. The total pre-lease
planning stage took ten months; five of those months were required for
the compilation of an EIS.'09 By January 1977, it was taking an average
of eleven months at the pre-lease stage to prepare the EIS."°
Second, state authorities, environmentalists, and fishermen were
deeply suspicious of the sudden burst of activity. The OCSLA, they
complained, did not give them, the very groups who might well be ad-
versely affected, any say in the matters at hand."' Other sectors of the
public did not believe that the OCSLA was doing enough to foster com-
petition in the offshore oil industry, as it was feared that only the largest
oil companies could afford the up front cash bonuses. After the bonuses
had been paid, it was believed, the fixed royalty was but a small imposi-
tion on corporate profits.
The result of this considerable public dissent was a legal and polit-
ical campaign against the expansion programs. 12  The environmental
statutes were used to mount a litigious assault on the Department of In-
terior's OCS decisions. The consequence was extensive delay, with lease
sales often deferred or dropped altogether." 3 Widespread political dis-
satisfaction with this state of affairs led to an exhaustive series of Con-
gressional hearings and decisions designed to change the OCS oil and gas
regime. The product which resulted was the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act Amendments of 1978'11 (OCSLAA). As this legislation pro-
107. For several discussions concerned with the effect of NEPA on OCS oil and gas leasing in
the 1970's, see GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IssuEs IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS FOR OIL
AND GAS DEVELOPMENT 33-35, 73-77 (1981); Craft, Recent Congressional Action on Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Oil and Gas Development, 13 TULSA L.J. 742, 747-50 (1978); McDermott, Expanded
Offshore Leasing and the Mandates of NEPA, 10 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 531 (1977).
108. Every such lease sale is regarded as an action "significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment" within the meaning of § 102 of NEPA (42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1982)). See
Kreuger, The Management of Federal Petroleum Resources in the United States, 27 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 61, 81 (1978).
109. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 107, at 33.
110. Id.
111. See H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 89-90, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONO. &
AD. NEWS 1450, 1496-97.
112. See Jones, Mead, & Sorensen, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978,
19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 885, 885-86 (1979).
113. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 107, at 38-45; see also Note, Environmen-
tal Law: Governmental Suspension of Outer Continental Shelf Oil Drilling Operations, 30 OKLA. L.
REV. 930 (1977) (discussing the environmentally based cancellation of leases in the Santa Barbara
Channel in the early 1970's).
114. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356, 1801-1866 (1982). For further discussion of the 1978 Amend-
ments and the issues surrounding their enactment, see Best, Outer Continental Shelf Development
[Vol. 21:23
22
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 21 [1985], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol21/iss1/2
OFFSHORE OIL DEVELOPMENT
vides the statutory basis for present-day OCS oil and gas leasing and
operations, an outline of the new leasing system and other relevant facets
of the OCSLAA will therefore be presented. It is stressed that the fol-
lowing analysis is not intended to cover all of the various provisions of
the OCSLAA. Rather, it is intended to delineate the most significant
features of the new regime and illuminate the major governmental
policies.
1. National Policy
Sections 2 and 102 of the OCSLAA give legislative expression to
national goals relating to the exploitation of the OCS.115 The main pol-
icy objectives of the OCSLAA are as follows: (1) to expedite exploration,
development, and production on the OCS and hence to achieve national
energy goals;1 16 (2) to provide proper environmental safeguards;117 (3) to
involve the coastal states in decision-making and make sufficient infor-
mation available to them to allow for long-term planning; 8 (4) to pro-
tect other users of the OCS, and coastal areas, from the impacts of
offshore oil development;" 9 (5) to insure that the public receives a fair
and equitable return from OCS oil and gas leasing;120 and (6) "to pre-
serve and maintain free enterprise competition" in the offshore oil indus-
try.' 2 ' As the substantive provisions of the OCSLAA are examined, it
will be possible to perceive how Congress attempted to facilitate the
achievement of these goals.
2. Authority
The OCSLA of 1953 gave the Secretary of the Interior authority to
administer OCS leasing and mineral operations. This primary authority
was retained by the Secretary in the OCSLAA.122 The authorising provi-
sion, section 5, is very broadly worded. It gives the Secretary the power
After a Year Under the OCS Lands Act Amendments, 27 INST. ON MIN. L. 152 (1980); Craft, supra
note 107, at 744-74; Jones, Mead, & Sorensen, supra note 112, at 888-908; Kreuger & Singer, An
Analysis of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 19 NAT. RESOURCEs J. 909
(1979); Moore, The OCS Lands Act Amendments of 1978-1980 and Beyond, 31 INST. ON OIL & GAS
L. & TAX'N 293 (1980); Comment, supra note 68, at 187-203.
115. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1332(3)-(6), 1802 (1982).
116. Id. §§ 1332(3), 1802(1).
117. Id. §§ 1332(3), 1802(2).
118. Id. §§ 1332(4), (5), 1802(4)-(6).
119. Id. §§ 1332(6), 1802(7), (8).
120. Id. § 1802(2)(c).
121. Id. § 1802(2)(d).
122. Id. § 1334.
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to "administer the provisions of this subehapter relating to the leasing of
the outer Continental Shelf, and. . . prescribe such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out such provisions." 123 For many years
the responsibility of the Secretary for OCS operations had been delegated
to two federal agencies. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) ar-
ranged the actual leasing process, while the United States Geological
Survey (USGS) administered post-lease operations. 24 This setup ceased
in 1982 with the formation of the Minerals Management Service
(MMS). 125 The MMS has both an onshore,'2 6 and an offshore role.
127
The Associate Director for Offshore Minerals Management has responsi-
bility for the latter. One of the two Deputy Associate Directors adminis-
ters leasing, while the other is responsible for operations and
enforcement. Also responsible to the Associate Director are four re-
gional MMS managers whose duties relate to the four OCS regions: the
Alaskan OCS, the Pacific OCS, the Atlantic OCS, and the Gulf of Mex-
ico. Inspection of OCS standards for environmental and personal safety,
and their enforcement, is undertaken through district MMS offices.
There are a varying number of standards attached to each regional OCS
office.
3. The Five-Year Leasing Program
This is one of the most significant of the innovations introduced by
the 1978 legislation. Section 18 of the OCSLAA envisages that all future
federal OCS leasing will proceed with reference to a five-year plan. 128
The Secretary of the Interior is responsible for the compilation of a pro-
gram129 consisting "of a schedule of proposed lease sales indicating, as
precisely as possible, the size, timing, and location of leasing activity
which he [the Secretary] determines will best meet national energy
needs . . ,3o Section 18 provides an exhaustive set of policy guide-
lines for the five-year plans.13 1 Some of the most important issues which
123. Id. § 1334(a).
124. For a good description of the pre-1982 OCS role of the BLM and the USGS, see Jones,
supra note 38, at 156-58.
125. Dep't of the Interior Secretarial Order No. 3071, 47 Fed. Reg. 4751 (1982).
126. The onshore role relates mainly to federal mineral royalty management. See 30 C.F.R.
§§ 201-220 (1983).
127. See id. § 250.10-.20; Martin, Outer Continental Shelf Leases and Operating Regulations, in 2
LAW OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES § 25.03[2], at 25-13 to -14 (1984).
128. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1982).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. § 1344(a)(I)-(4).
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the Secretary must consider in drawing up an OCS program are:
(1) overall social, economic, and environmental effects of OCS develop-
ment on marine, coastal, and human environments;' 32 (2) the existing
information relating to pertinent geological, environmental, and eco-
nomic facets of selected OCS regions,' 33 with "an equitable sharing of
developmental benefits and environmental risks among the various re-
gions";'34 (3) the objectives of coastal states as identified by state gover-
nors;' 35 (4) relative environmental sensitivity and relative hydrocarbon-
bearing potential of the OCS regions;136 and (5) the necessity to "assure
receipt of fair market value for the lands leased."' 3
7
Responding to the fears of the coastal states, Congress provided for
a substantial degree of participation in this first stage of the offshore pro-
cess. Specifically, during preparation of the five-year program, the Secre-
tary must invite suggestions from the governor of any state which may be
affected. 38  He must also invite the suggestions of interested federal
agencies and the Attorney General.' 39 It was hoped that the latter's in-
volvement would enhance the goal of fostering competition."4
After the proposed program has been finalised it must be published
in the Federal Register.'4 ' However, at least sixty days must elapse be-
tween the completion of the proposed program and its publication. 42
This period is required so that the governor of each affected state may
review and comment on the plan. If any suggestion is received by the
Secretary within fifteen days of the proposed program's publication, the
Secretary must reply, "granting or denying such request in whole or in
part . . . . '4 This response is to contain an adequate statement of rea-
sons for the given decision.'"
When the proposed program is published copies are also to be sent
to Congress, the Attorney General, and the governors.' 45 Within ninety
132. Id. § 1344(a)(1).
133. Id. § 1344(a)(2)(A).
134. Id. § 1344(a)(2)(B).
135. Id. § 1344(a)(2)(F).
136. Id. §§ 1344(a)(2)(G), (H), 1344(a)(3).
137. Id. § 1344(a)(4).
138. Id. § 1344(c)(1).
139. Id.
140. See H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1450, 1454.
141. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(c)(3) (1982).
142. Id. § 1344(c)(2).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. § 1344(c)(3).
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days of publication in the Federal Register, the Attorney General, in con-
sultation with the Federal Trade Commission, may make comments on
the effect of the plan on competition. 146 Any other person may submit
his own comments.147 Before the Secretary ultimately approves his leas-
ing program he must submit it again to Congress and to the President,
together with any comments or suggestions received. 48 If he does not
accept recommendations from the Attorney General, the governors, or
the local governments of affected states, he must provide an explanation
for his decision.149
4. The Leasing System
In keeping with the original OCS legislation,15 only a leasing sys-
tem (as opposed, for instance, to a hiring system) of exploitation was
authorised. 151 Section 8 provides that an OCS oil and gas lease is to be of
an area not exceeding 5,760 acres unless the Secretary finds that a larger
acreage is required to be economical.' 52 The initial or primary term is to
be five years, but this can be increased to ten years if the Secretary finds
that a longer period is necessary because of deep water or unusually ad-
verse conditions.' 53 While maintenance in the initial term may or may
not require delay rentals,154 the lease may definitely not be maintained
beyond the initial term without production in paying quantities or other
approved drilling operations.' 55 The lease gives the right to explore for,
develop, and produce the oil and gas in the lease acreage.1 56 This right is
subject to the lessee obtaining the Secretary's approval for exploration
and development plans.' 57 The lease must also require that the lessee
offer twenty percent of his hydrocarbon production to small and in-
dependent refineries 151 within the meaning of the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act of 1973."59 The latter provision represents yet another
attempt to promote competition within the oil industry.
146. Id. § 1344(d)(1).
147. Id.
148. Id. § 1344(d)(2).
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
151. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1982).
152. Id. § 1337(b)(1).
153. Id. § 1337(b)(2)(A), (B).
154. Id. § 1337(b)(6).
155. Id. § 1337(b)(2).
156. Id. § 1337(b)(4).
157. Id.
158.- Id. § 1337(b)(7).
159. 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760 (1982).
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In Section One it was shown that in relation to mineral resources a
government is a regulator as well as a landowner. 16' But in the United
States, the Secretary of the Interior's power to alter the terms of a federal
oil and gas lease after it has been executed is subject to, and limited by,
the provisions of the American Constitution. The case of Union Oil Co.
v. Morton1 61 is a good example of how the Constitution may affect the
regulatory decisions of the Secretary of the Interior. In early 1969, the
infamous Santa Barbara blowout occurred on one of Union Oil's lease
tracts in the Santa Barbara Channel.1 62 Prior to the blowout, Union Oil
had been granted permission to install a further production platform on
the tract. But in the wake of the blowout, permission was withdrawn.
Union Oil and three other oil companies who held equity interests in the
lease filed suit. One of their major arguments was that the suspension
was in reality a denial of their right to operate the lease and was hence a
"taking" without compensation under the fifth amendment. 163 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that if the
suspension did actually amount to a cancellation of the lease, the Secre-
tary's action constituted a violation of the fifth amendment. 61  As Con-
gress had not, reasoned the court, explicitly authorised compensation for
such a "taking," the decision to do so would have to be considered ultra
vires. 161 To avoid such constitutional difficulties, OCS oil and gas leases
are now concluded subject to future laws and regulations. In addition,
section 5 of the OCSLAA now provides, in certain circumstances, for the
cancellation or suspension of OCS leases.1 66 In the event of a lawful can-
cellation the same section allows for the granting of compensation. 67
The leasing process itself will not be considered in this section of the
essay. A number of regulations and other procedures govern the highly
complex pre-lease stage, and deal with such issues as the means of select-
ing OCS tracts to be offered for auction, methods of environmental anal-
ysis, and tract evaluation for fair market value. Changes in these
regulations and procedures have been the key to the present administra-
tion's expanded program for leasing. Accordingly, an extensive analysis
160. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text.
161. 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally Note, supra note 113, at 930-37 (discussing the
implications of the case for offshore oil development).
162. See supra note 65.
163. 512 F.2d at 750-51.
164. Id. at 752.
165. Id. at 750.
166. See 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(1), (2) (1982).
167. Id. § 1334(a)(2)(C).
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of the old and new pre-lease procedures will appear in Section Three. 161
It should be briefly noted, however, that the OCSLAA gives the coastal
states an opportunity to participate in the OCS process at the lease stage.
At least thirty days before any lease sale, the Secretary of the Interior
must publish in the Federal Register, and submit to Congress, a notice
identifying the tracts which he proposes to lease and the bidding system
he intends to use. 169 The governor of any affected state can submit sug-
gestions with respect to such lease sale within sixty days after the notice
has been given.170 The Secretary must accept these recommendations if
he thinks they adequately balance the national interest with the benefit of
the citizens of the state.17' The national interest is to be construed in a
way that gives high priority to the environmentally balanced production
of oil and gas. 72 The Secretary's determination of this issue can only be
challenged on the grounds that it is arbitrary and capricious. 173
5. The New Bidding System
The previous offshore regime had theoretically given the Secretary
of the Interior the right to use two bidding systems. But an overwhelm-
ing majority of pre-1978 lease sales had utilised the cash bonus bid with
fixed royalty method. Apprehension over the supposed anti-competitive
effects of this bidding mechanism was addressed by the 1978 Amend-
ments. As was the case previously, section 8(a) of the 1978 Amendments
authorises the Secretary to award leases to the highest responsible quali-
fied bidder. 74 All bidding must be conducted by sealed bid.17 Section
8(a) substantially expands the Secretary's range of bidding options by
authorising four basic bid variables: the cash bonus bid,1 76 the royalty
bid, 177 the work commitment bid,' 78 and the net profits share bid.179
Although the Secretary has further discretion to use any other variable
which is consistent with the purposes of the Act, 80 section 8(a) prohibits
168. See infra notes 275-302 and accompanying text.
169. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(8) (1982).
170. Id. § 1345(a), (b).
171. Id. § 1345(c).
172. Id.
173. Id. § 1345(d).
174. Id. § 1337(a)(1).
175. Id. § 1337(a).
176. Id. § 1337(a)(1)(A).
177. Id. § 1337(a)(1)(B).
178. Id. § 1337(a)(1)(G).
179. Id. § 1337(a)(1)(D).
180. Id. § 1337(a)(1)(H).
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the use of more than one bid variable for a given modification. 18 1
A major reason for the authorisation of such a wide variety of bid
alternatives was to encourage the DOI to experiment and innovate.182 It
was hoped that experimentation with differing methods might illuminate
the most satisfactory option. To ensure that the Secretary did not con-
tinue to utilise only one system, Congress stipulated that at least twenty
percent, but not more than sixty percent, of all acreage leased in a given
year had to be leased by a bidding system other than a cash bonus bid
with fixed royalty.8 3 This stipulation was qualified by a proviso allowing
the Secretary to ignore the twenty percent requirement if he determined
that it was "inconsistent with the purposes and policies of this sub-
chapter."'8 4 The Attorney General, in consultation with the Federal
Trade Commission, must be given at least thirty days to review the re-
sults of a lease sale before the Secretary announces lease awards.8 5
6. Exploration and Development Plans
Any person may obtain a permit to conduct preliminary geological
or geophysical exploration on the OCS as authorised by the Secretary of
the Interior.'8 6 But a lessee cannot conduct any drilling on his own lease
acreage unless such exploration is undertaken pursuant to an exploration
plan.'8 7 The plan, which must be submitted to the Secretary of the Inte-
rior for approval, may relate to two or more tracts, and may be the joint
effort of two or more lessees. 88 The exploration plan can only be ap-
proved by the Secretary if he finds that it is consistent with the OC-
SLAA, the regulations passed under the OCSLAA, and the terms of the
lease.'8 9 The Secretary can require modifications to be made which
would ensure consistency. 190 Before an exploration plan can be ap-
proved, it must also conform to the "consistency" requirement of the
CZMA.' g' After the exploration plan has been approved, the lessee may
181. Id.
182. See H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 138-41, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEvs 1450, 1544-47.
183. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(5)(B) (1982).
184. Id.
185. Id. § 1337(c)(1).
186. Id. § 1340(a)(1).
187. Id. § 1340(b).
188. Id. § 1340(c)(1).
189. Id.
190. Id.
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be required to obtain a drilling permit before he can begin actual work. 192
Should hydrocarbons in paying quantities be found on the lease
acreage, commercial production cannot begin till the lessee has obtained
the Secretary's approval for a development and production plan. 193 Sec-
tion 25 makes an exception in this respect for leases in the Gulf of Mex-
ico, 94 and further provides that a plan may cover more than one lease. 195
Section 19 of the OCSLAA provides that the governor of any affected
state has a right to submit comments on any development plan before it
is approved by the Secretary. 96 As with lease sales, the governor is given
sixty days to forward such suggestions.1 97 The Secretary must accept
them if he thinks "that they provide for a reasonable balance between the
national interest and the well-being of the citizens of the affected
State."' 9 The Secretary's decisions on these issues can only be chal-
lenged on the ground that they are arbitrary and capricious. 199 The de-
velopment plan, like the exploration plan, must conform to the
"consistency" requirement of the CZMA.2°
Within sixty days after the comment period, the Secretary must ap-
prove, reject, or require modifications in the plan.2 ' Section 25 indicates
that he must reject the plan if the lessee fails to show that he can comply
with the relevant provisions of law, if the operations could threaten na-
tional security or defense, or if the plan would threaten serious damage to
wildlife or the environment with no prospect of the threat decreasing. 202
7. The Information Programs
Section 20 of the OCSLAA sets up an Environmental Studies Pro-
gram.20 3 This program is intended to facilitate the gathering of environ-
mental information on any area where lease sales are proposed to be
held. The information can then be used in the "assessment and manage-
192. See 43 U.S.C. § 1340(d) (1982); see also 30 C.F.R. § 250.36 (1983) (describing permit appli-
cation procedures).
193. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1) (1982).
194. Id.
195. Id. § 1351(c).
196. Id. § 1345(a).
197. Id. § 1345(b).
198. Id. § 1345(c).
199. Id. § 1345(d).
200. See id. § 1351(d); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B)(i) (setting forth consistency
requirements).
201. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(h)(1) (1982).
202. Id. § 1351(h)(1)(A)-(D).
203. Id. § 1346.
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ment of environmental impacts" on the OCS and coastal areas.' 4 The
Secretary is also given authority to conduct ongoing environmental stud-
ies during the post-lease stage.2 05 Section 20 requires that there be full
cooperation with the states.20 6
The OCS Oil and Gas Information Program is created by section
26.207 This section provides that any lessee who is engaged in OCS ex-
ploration, development, or production, must allow the Secretary access
to all data and information accruing from such activities.20 8 In addition,
there are precautions designed to ensure that a lessee's anonymity and
competitive position are not prejudiced.2°  Every federal department is
likewise required to make available to the Secretary all information that
is likely to be useful to him in his OCS responsibilities. 210 This pool of
information is designed to help the Secretary carry out his duties in a
more informed fashion, and assist coastal states and local governments in
planning for OCS developments.
8. The Compensation Funds
The Offshore Oil Pollution Compensation Fund211 is available to
meet the claims of any party who suffers economic loss in the removal of
spilled oil, or from damage to property resulting from oil pollution.21 2
The Fund, which is administered by the Secretary of Transportation and
the Secretary of the Treasury,21 3 does not normally exceed the amount of
$200,000,000,214 and is financed by a levy on OCS producers.215 Section
304 also imposes a type of limited strict liability on owners and operators
of offending vessels or offshore installations. 216 These statutory provi-
sions are designed as an alternative to fault liability.
The Fisherman's Contingency Fund is administered by the Secre-
tary of Commerce.21 7 Its purpose is to provide a means of compensation
204. Id. § 1346(a)(1).
205. Id. § 1346(b).
206. Id. § 1346(c).
207. Id. § 1352(a)(1)(A).
208. Id. § 1352(a)(1).
209. Id. § 1352(c)(1), (2).
210. Id. § 1352(a)(2).
211. Id. §§ 1811-1824.
212. Id. § 1813(a)(1), (2).
213. Id. § 1812(a).
214. Id.
215. Id. § 1812(d)(1).
216. Id. § 1814.
217. Id. § 1842(a)(1). See generally MacKenzie & Smith, The Fisherman's Contingency Fund:
Resolving Gear Conflicts Between Outer Continental Shelf Hydrocarbon Development and Commer-
1985]
31
Vass: A Comparison of American and British Offshore Oil Development dur
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1985
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
for damages to, or loss of, fishing gear and any resulting economic loss to
commercial fishermen due to activities related to oil and gas. 218 Limited
in amount to two million dollars,219 the Fisherman's Contingency Fund
is also financed by means of an OCS levy.220 Payments cannot be made
from it when the damage is ascertained as having being caused by "the
commercial fisherman making the claim."' 221 There are, in any case, lim-
its to recoverable amounts.222 Unlike the Offshore Oil Pollution Com-
pensation Fund, the Fisherman's Contingency Fund is not intended as an
alternative to fault liability.
9. Federal Controls over the Disposition of Hydrocarbons
There are three significant controls that the OCSLAA gives the fed-
eral government over OCS oil and gas. Section 27 gives the Secretary of
the Interior the right to demand that all OCS royalties or net profit
shares be paid in kind.223 It further gives the United States the right to
purchase 162/3% of all OCS oil and gas production from leases granted
under the OCSLAA.22 Such purchase must be at the regulated or fair
market price225 and is reducible by the volume of oil and gas that the
United States receives from royalties and profit shares.226 Lastly, section
12 notes that in time of war, or at any time that the President shall de-
cide, the United States shall have "the right of first refusal" to buy all or
any fraction of total OCS production.227
D. Post-OCSLAA Developments
The OCSLAA was an attempt to expedite OCS exploration and pro-
duction, to provide detailed policy guidance for DOI, and to help allay
cial Fishing, 3 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 105 (1983) (describing the enactment and implementation
of the Fisherman's Contingency Fund).
218. 43 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(1) (1982).
219. Id. § 1842(a)(1).
220. Id. § 1842(b)(1).
221. Id. § 1843(c)(2)(A).
222. Id. § 1843(c)(2)(D).
223. Id. § 1353(a)(1).
224. Id. § 1353(a)(2).
225. Id. Until 1981 there was a system of controls which governed the price of oil. To en-
courage domestic oil production and conservation, President Carter in 1979 initiated a program of
gradual decontrol. Oil price regulation, however, was not completely lifted until after the Reagan
administration took office in 1981. For a history of the previous system of oil price control, see Lilly
& Seymour, The 1980 Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax An Overview From An Industry Perspective, 24
How. L.J. 125 (1981).
226. 43 U.S.C. § 1353(a)(2).
227. Id. § 1341(b).
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the fears of, and attract the participation and support of, coastal states
and other interested parties. It should be noted, however, that the OC-
SLAA does little to assist in the expansion of offshore activity. Indeed,
many of the new provisions, particularly those relating to the five-year
program requirement228 and the new leasing procedures,229 make the off-
shore process more time consuming and complex. The OCSLAA also
expressly encourages private litigation by enabling any private citizen
with a valid legal interest to bring a civil action to compel any person,
including the Secretary of the Interior, to comply with the statute.23 0 If
the issue relates to the Secretary's approval of a five-year leasing pro-
gram, the action must be brought in the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals.231
At the time of the passing of the OCSLAA, many legislators felt
that since the coastal states' role in federal offshore leasing was now en-
shrined, future OCS programs would be subjected to less dissent.23 2 But
other legislators foresaw that another possible result of the OCSLAA
would be to give coastal states and those who might oppose a particular
OCS program the opportunity to use the new legislation's exhaustive
provisions as a delaying mechanism.233
The Shah of Iran was toppled from power a year after the enactment
of the OCSLAA. America, along with much of the free world, then
faced further oil supply problems and yet another round of substantial
price increases. As President Carter's administration journeyed into its
last year, the vulnerability of the United States had once again been un-
derscored. In 1980 America spent a vast eighty-two billion dollars on
foreign oil 234 and, despite the various efforts of successive administra-
tions, the United States was still about forty percent dependent on for-
eign oil imports in the latter years of the 1970's.231 By the end of the
228. See supra notes 128-49 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 150-73 and accompanying text.
230. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(1) (1982).
231. Id. § 1349(c)(1).
232. See H.R. REp. No. 590, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1450, 1457-58.
233. Rep. John Breaux (Democrat, La.), who was a majority member of the House Ad Hoc
Select Committee on the Outer Continental Shelf, remarked that "[t]he bill is stuffed with features to
delay activities on the Outer Continental Shelf. Id. at 298-99, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 1651.
234. OCS Oversight-Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Panama Canal/Outer Conti-
nental Shelf ofthe House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1981)
(testimony of James B. Edwards, Secretary of Energy) [hereinafter cited as OCS Oversight-Part 2].
235. Palmer & Kelly, America's Five-Year Offshore Leasing Plan-Its Importance in Increasing
Domestic Petroleum Reserves and the Role of Industry in Its Development and Implementation, in 21
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decade, it became clear that a major initiative would be required to pre-
vent American production from declining further. Yet the trend in the
1970's was for the United States to consume more oil than was being
discovered. In 1978, for example, only 479 million barrels were discov-
ered, a mere seven percent of the total consumption in the United States
for that year.236
Nowhere was the failure of governmental attempts to boost United
States oil production more pointed than in the OCS.2 37 From 1954 to
1980 only two percent of an OCS believed to possess up to sixty percent
of presently undiscovered American oil and gas reserves238 had been
leased. 39 In fact, according to the Under Secretary of the Department of
the Interior, J.J. Simmons III, "[p]ast policies called for us to continue
leasing at only one-tenth of one percent a year." 2' American offshore
production had actually decreased thirty-four percent between 1970 and
1980,241 while America's share of world offshore oil production had de-
creased from 21.7% in 1970 to 7.6% in 1980.242 By 1980 there was still
no production from any part of the OCS other than the western Gulf of
Mexico and the Santa Barbara Channel in California.243 The Alaskan
OCS, estimated to hold forty-four percent of the OCS's total undiscov-
ered oil reserves, was left practically untouched. 2'
If these trends in American energy production were to continue into
the 1980's, then there would be no alternative to an increased reliance on
OPEC. The Middle East was the only oil-producing region in the world
with the available capacity to feed the appetite of the largest oil consumer
on earth. A reversal of these trends with their attendant strategic and
economic disadvantages would necessitate either a radical decrease in
American consumption, a massive expansion in American production, or
a combination of both.
EXPLORATION & ECON. OF THE PET. INDUsTRY 224 (1983); Hart, Energy and National Security, 36
REc. A.B. CrTy N.Y. 280 (1981).
236. Ivanhoe, Will there be enough oil in the 1980s?, WoRLD OIL, Oct. 1980, at 175, 181.
237. Palmer & Kelly, supra note 235, at 225.
238. Id.
239. Consideration of Legislation, supra note 3, at 901 (statement of J.J. Simmons III, Under
Secretary, Dep't of the Interior).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 902.
242. Palmer & Kelly, supra note 235, at 225.
243. See MINERA.S MGMT. SERVICE, supra note 63, at 57-65.
244. Jones, supra note 38, at 172 n.166.
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III. AMERICAN OFFSHORE OIL DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
In the presidential election of 1980, Ronald Reagan, the Republican
candidate, won a convincing victory over the incumbent, Mr. Carter.
Solidly backed by the oil industry, Mr. Reagan vowed that his adminis-
tration would "'do whatever is necessary' to produce more domestic oil
and natural gas."245
The President chose Mr. James Watt as his Secretary of the Interior.
Watt's previous record was varied and impressive. A graduate of the
University of Wyoming, he had been an advisor to former Senator Mil-
ward Simpson of Wyoming and a lobbyist in Washington with the
United States Chamber of Commerce. During the first Nixon adminis-
tration he had been Under Secretary (1969) and Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary (1969-72) of the DOI. He was the Director of the Bureau of
Outdoor Recreation from 1972 to 1975, and was later appointed to the
Federal Power Commission. During much of the Carter administration,
Watt was President and Chief Legal Officer to the Mountain States Legal
Foundation, a public interest law firm specialising in challenges to fed-
eral environmental policy.2 46
Secretary Watt regarded the goal of expanding oil and gas explora-
tion and production as a primary objective. He believed that such an
expansion would help inventory America's resources, ensure a stable
source of oil supply, and increase the nation's economic and strategic
independence.247 Mr. Watt thought that earlier attempts to accelerate
OCS activity "fell far short of the type of effort needed to fully explore
and develop the hydrocarbon resources of our offshore lands. '248 James
Watt's ambitious plans envisaged a major boom for the oil industry and
the economy generally, with bonus and royalty payments swelling federal
coffers.24 9 He hoped that a reduction in foreign imports would channel
billions of dollars that would otherwise be spent abroad into the domestic
economy. ° Mr. Watt was emphatic that it would take private enter-
prise to go out and achieve these goals; the federal authorities could
merely fashion an appropriate offshore regime for the oil companies to
245. Rogers, Washington in 1981, WORLD OIL, Feb. 15, 1981, at 29, 29; see also Rogers, Where
the candidates stand, WORLD OIL, June 1980, at 37, 45-47 (analysing President Reagan's pre-elec-
tion views on energy development).
246. OCS Oversight-Part 2, supra note 234, at 48.
247. Id. at 49-51.
248. Id. at 51.
249. Id. at 49-52.
250. Id. at 50.
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work under.25 1 Despite the expansion-oriented nature of these policies,
DOI remained committed to the preservation of America's environment:
"We must reduce our dependency on those foreign imports, not only for
the economical reasons with which we read so much about, billions, tens
of billions going out each year to foreign countries but, we must protect
our environment. 252
Generally, the offshore goals of the Reagan administration are:
(1) to expedite and expand OCS exploration and production, to provide a
secure source of domestic petroleum, and to lessen America's reliance on
foreign oil; (2) to inventory the resources of the OCS; (3) to facilitate a
boom for the oil industry with attendant wider economic and fiscal ef-
fects; (4) to rely on the private sector to undertake the exploitation; and
(5) to continue protection of the environment.253 It should be noted that
these goals do not involve any departure from the national policies stipu-
lated in the OCSLAA. Indeed, Mr. Watt and the Republican adminis-
tration viewed the OCSLAA as a mandate for their plans to expedite
market-oriented OCS operations. Be this as it may, the OCSLAA was to
provide the ammunition for many of the legal challenges later levelled
against the Secretary's decisions.
A. Industry's Perspective
However else the government might encourage OCS development, it
was clear that the primary task would have to be the creation of an off-
shore regime which would make it possible and economically feasible for
industry to commit the enormous amounts of capital and technology that
would be required. Since the participation of industry is so critical for
offshore development, it is essential, before going on to look in detail at
the Watt innovations, to briefly illuminate the outlook of the oil industry.
Industry was impatient with what it saw as the delays and overregu-
lation of the 1970's. The policies of the past, it was believed, had been
totally ineffectual in opening up the one billion acres of the OCS; too
little acreage had been offered, too slowly, and in the wrong places. The
environmental statutes and their attendant regulations were regarded as
a foolish and debilitating overreaction. Industry believed that its envi-
ronmental record was second to none. Oil men pointed out that leaks
from offshore operations had been shown by a report undertaken for the
251. See id. at 52.
252. Id. at 50.
253. See ict at 49-55.
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National Academy of Science to cause approximately five percent of the
oil pollution in the world's oceans.2 54 The same study went on to show
that from 1975 to 1978 the American offshore industry contributed about
0.05% to total oceanic oil pollution. 55
Industry wanted a speedy opening of America's offshore, a stable
regime conducive to long-term planning, and less government regulation.
Economically speaking, the goal of the oil corporations was to expand
exploration and production, a set of objectives similar to those espoused
by DOI.
B. The New Offshore Regime
In October 1978 the then Secretary of the Interior, Cecil Andrus,
began drawing up a five-year leasing program for the OCS. A draft of
the proposed plan was sent to governors of affected states in March 1979.
Because of various delays, a final proposed plan was not sent to President
Carter and the Congress till over a year later. The plan envisaged thirty-
six lease sales, ten of which were to be in the Alaskan OCS. On June 16,
1980, Secretary Andrus approved the program. In response, California,
Alaska, and various environmental organisations filed suit against the
new OCS plan in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.25 6 These states and groups wanted the plan to be re-
manded to the Secretary2 57 in accordance with section 23(c)(6) of the
OCSLAA.258
In December 1980, while litigation was pending, Cecil Andrus be-
gan a review of his program, a review which James Watt eventually con-
tinued in 1981. Finding that the Andrus program was not an
appropriate vehicle to further his policy goals, Watt began the prepara-
tion of a new OCS plan.259 A draft of the proposed program was sent to
the governors of coastal states on April 16, 198 1.2 60 This program pro-
vided for a dramatic expansion in the availability of quality acreage and
for the streamlining of certain leasing procedures. On July 31, 1981, the
plan was published in the Federal Register, and the ninety day comment
254. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SAFETY AND OFFSHORE OIL 62 (1981).
255. Id. at 63.
256. California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For a more detailed description of the
events that occurred after October 1978 and before the filing of suit, see id. at 1299-1300.
257. See id. at 1300.
258. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(c)(6) (1982).
259. OCS Oversight-Part 2, supra note 234, at 51 (testimony of Secretary James G. Watt).
260. Dep't of the Interior, News Release (April 16, 1981).
1985]
37
Vass: A Comparison of American and British Offshore Oil Development dur
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1985
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
period began.261
On October 6, 1981, the D.C. Court of Appeals issued its decision
on the challenge by California, Alaska, and others to the Andrus pro-
gram. In California v. Watt26 2 (Watt 1) the court decided that Secretary
Andrus's schedule of leasing had failed, on a number of points, to prop-
erly follow the required analysis set out in section 18 of the OCSLAA.
261
The plan was remanded to the Secretary, who was directed to remedy the
deficiencies. On March 15, 1982, Secretary Watt announced his tentative
proposed five-year plan in accordance with the court's directions. 2" By
the summer of 1982 the complex procedures for review and comment
had been completed and the plan was approved.
C. The Watt Plan and Associated Policies
One way to effect the goals of the Reagan administration would
have been to alter the OCSLAA and the environmental statutes so as to
widen DOI's discretion in the leasing process and, therefore, reduce the
possibilities for litigious challenges. Providing that such legislation
would be passed by Congress, this seemed to be a plausible suggestion.
Nevertheless, Secretary Watt did not adopt this course. Instead, he
blamed the failure of the past not on statutes, but on government. Refer-
ring to Project Independence he said, "President Nixon, 10 years ago,
called for leasing 10 million acres a year. We never met it. Mainly, the
government has not allowed it."26 Secretary Watt's policies did not in-
volve any substantial changes to offshore legislation. He approved of the
participation that the states and the public were given in the OCS pro-
cess. Instead of changing statutes, Secretary Watt attempted to create a
market-oriented system of leasing by using the discretion that existing
legislation gave him.2 6 6
Nevertheless, the Watt plan for OCS development did envisage
261. See 46 Fed. Reg. 39,226-28 (1981).
262. 668 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
263. Id. at 1303-22. For a discussion of Watt , see Smyth, An Analysis of Section 18 of the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act as Interpreted in California v. Watt: Has it Accomplished its Purpose?,
14 NAT. RESOURCES L. NEWSLE=rrE 1 (1982); Casenote, The Seaweed Rebellion: Federal-State
Conflicts Over Offshore Oil and Gas Development, 18 WILLAME-rE L. REv. 535 (1982); Comment,
The Seaweed Rebellion Revisited: Continuing Federal-State Conflict in OCS Oil and Gas Leasing, 20
WILLAMEym L. Rav. 83 (1984).
264. See 47 Fed. Reg. 11,980 (1982).
265. OCS Oversight-Part 2, supra note 234, at 59.
266. Concerning his new five-year program, Watt emphasised that "implementation of the draft
proposed 5-year program and the attendant prelease streamlining proposals can be achieved admin-
istratively under the act [OCSLAA] as it now stands." OCS Oversight-Part 2, supra note 234, at 54
(testimony of Secretary James Watt).
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some substantive changes in regulations and changes in the mode of their
observance. It was alleged by many in the oil industry that the previous
administration had often foregone development when it appeared that
there was any chance of risk to the environment. As Paul L. Kelly, an
industry witness supporting Watt's nomination for the post of Secretary
of Interior put it, "the administration during the past 4 years has adopted
what is practically tantamount to a 'zero risk' approach to OCS manage-
ment." '67 As reflected by the fact that Watt leased twice as much acreage
in 1981, using the Andrus schedule, as his predecessor had done in
1980,268 the new Secretary obviously hoped to pursue a less cautious pol-
icy. Mr. Watt's proposals for harnessing industry to achieve the nation's
energy goals embodied the following four main facets: (1) a large in-
crease in the number of prospective areas to be leased; (2) the introduc-
tion of areawide environmental analysis, areawide leasing, and
telescoping; (3) the retention of the bonus bid as the bidding variable; and
(4) the introduction of new tract evaluation techniques.269
1. The Number of Lease Sales and Their Location
The number of lease sales was to be increased from thirty-six to
forty-one. Sixteen of these lease sales were to be in the Alaskan OCS,
and twelve were to be in the Gulf of Mexico.270 Many of the most lucra-
tive areas were to be leased first. Given the fact that the new lease sales
were to utilise the areawide method discussed immediately below, the
program's effect was to open up vast sections of the OCS to industry. 7 1
Expansion into the Alaskan OCS, where so much of the undiscovered oil
was thought to lie, was the linchpin of the program. As Watt himself
had promised, "there will be greater emphasis on early entry into areas of
high potential. Here we are talking of the frontier areas of offshore
Alaska."272 The program, if fully implemented, would result in up to
one billion OCS acres being considered for leasing by 1987.273 By com-
267. James G. Watt Nomination: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural
Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 386 (1981) (testimony of Paul L. Kelly).
268. Sec. Watt leased 2.23 million acres in 1981, whereas Sec. Andrus leased 1.13 million acres
in 1980. Dep't of the Interior, News Release (Jan. 11, 1982).
269. See OCS Oversight-Part 2, supra note 234, at 49-64 (testimony of Secretary James G.
Watt).
270. Dep't of the Interior, News Release (July 21, 1982).
271. See generally Kelly, Furor building over OCS Program, DRILLING CONTRACTOR, Sept.
1982, at 66, 66-82 (chronicling reaction to accelerated OCS leasing).
272. OCS Oversight-Part 2, supra note 234, at 51 (testimony of Secretary James G. Watt).
273. Letter from Secretary James G. Watt to President Ronald Reagan (Jan. 20, 1983), reprinted
in MINERALS MGMT. SERVICE, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, A YEAR OF SuccEss 3 (1982-83).
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parison, Secretary Andrus's program would have considered fifty-eight
million acres. In fact, as of April 26, 1983, only 84.8 million acres had
been considered since the OCS program began in 1954.274
2. The Areawide Concept, Telescoping, and Their Ramifications
Before the new streamlined lease procedures introduced by Secre-
tary Watt can be evaluated, it will be necessary to give a brief synopsis of
the former system. Under the old system, once a lease sale had been
scheduled for a particular date, the first important pre-lease step would
be the publishing of a Call for Nominations in the Federal Register.2 7 In
the Call, the BLM would designate a small to moderate amount of acre-
age that would be considered for leasing. Industry was then invited to
forward details of specific tracts that were of interest. Wider public com-
ment was also invited. In Lease Sale 42, for example, held off the shores
of New England, the BLM in 1975 invited nominations with respect to
15.8 million acres. In that particular instance, eighteen companies nomi-
nated 10.9 million acres as being desirable.2 76 The BLM's tendency (es-
pecially marked in frontier areas) was to recommend for further pre-lease
analysis only the most heavily nominated tracts. Thus in Lease Sale 42
this meant that 1.2 million acres, thirteen percent of the acreage that
industry had shown an interest in, was included in the Tentative Tract
Selection2 77 decided by the Secretary of the Interior.27  Under the old
system, an average of about sixteen percent of industry-nominated tracts
were included in the Tentative Tract Selections.279
Only after Tract Selection had occurred could compliance with
NEPA begin. This was done in two stages. First, a Draft Environmental
Impact Statement (DEIS) would be prepared; the DEIS discussed the
likely effects of oil and gas leasing on each OCS tract to be offered. After
the DEIS had been circulated for public review and comment, a Final
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) would be drawn up on the
same tract-specific basis. 280 At least one month after the FEIS had been
completed, a Proposed Notice of Sale would be published in the Federal
274. MINERALS MGMT. SERVICE, supra note 63, at 12.
275. 43 C.F.R. § 3313.1 (1981).
276. Am. Pet. Inst., Draft Comments on Areawide Leasing (May 4, 1982).
277. For previous regulations dealing with tract selection, see 43 C.F.R. § 3314.1 (1981).
278. Am. Pet. Inst., supra note 276.
279. OCS Oversight-Part 2, supra note 234, at 54 (testimony of Secretary James G. Watt).
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Register.28 The Proposed Notice of Sale would refer to such matters as
details of tracts to be leased, measures to avoid adverse environmental
impacts, and conditions which might be included with reference to leases
on certain tracts. The Proposed Notice of Sale would be sent to the gov-
ernors of the affected state or states, followed by the sixty-day comment
period provided for by section 19 of the OCSLAA.282 Thirty days would
then be given for review by the Department of Energy283 (DOE), fol-
lowed by publication of a final Notice of Sale in the Federal Register.
The lease sale itself would ensue not less than thirty days afterwards.
Before the sale, the BLM would also undertake a fairly exhaustive eco-
nomic evaluation of each tract to be offered in order to obtain an accu-
rate idea of fair market value.284 On the average, these successive
procedures took forty-two months to complete.285 Much depended, of
course, on how quickly the environmental analysis could proceed, and
whether there were any delays caused by litigation.
Secretary Watt proposed very extensive changes in this pre-lease
procedure. In particular, he planned to use the areawide concept and the
idea of telescoping, two approaches that will be explained as the new
procedures are described. The new pre-lease stage begins with a state-
ment in the Federal Register giving notice of MMS's intent to prepare an
EIS for the lease sale. It initiates a "scoping" process whereby important
issues of environmental concern are quickly brought to DOI's atten-
tion.286 This process consists in the early identification of areas of partic-
ular environmental concern and the formulation of appropriate evasive
measures. The environmental analysis required by NEPA begins before
the input of industry is solicited. Under the old system, this would have
been impossible because the EIS process was undertaken on a tract-spe-
cific basis. This is no longer the case. Secretary Watt divided the OCS
regions into planning areas. Each lease sale relates to a particular area.
The EIS is undertaken on an areawide basis less any tracts which are
found early on to be unavailable. 287 The scope and the purpose of such
an EIS is different from the older variety since its task is to consider the
281. See id.; 43 C.F.R. § 3315.1, .2 (1981).
282. 43 U.S.C. § 1345(a), (b) (1982).
283. 43 C.F.R. § 3315.3 (1981).
284. For a short description of the former system, see OCS Oversight-Part 2, supra note 234, at
58 (testimony of Secretary James G. Watt).
285. MINERALS MOMT. SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FROM POLICY TO PRODUC-
TION-OFFSHORE LEASING AND OPERATIONs 4 (1983).
286. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (1983).
287. OCS Oversight-Part 2, supra note 234, at 233 (statement of J. Robinson 'West, Assistant
Secretary for Policy, Budget and Administration, Dep't of the Interior).
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risks which may affect the area if the region as a whole develops its esti-
mated reserves. As J. Robinson West, Assistant Secretary for Policy,
Budget, and Administration for the DOI, stated, "the EIS prepared for
the first offering in a planned area under the new concept will emphasize
analysis, rather than description." '288 This DOI policy was assisted by
CEQ regulations which permit "tiering," '289 an idea which holds that fed-
eral agencies should tailor their environmental assessments to suit the
decision in question. For example, an environmental analysis (which
may not necessarily involve an EIS) is always undertaken before explora-
tion plans can be approved.29 ° It would be futile and repetitive, reasoned
the CEQ, for a pre-lease EIS to prematurely relate information relevant
to a particular exploration application.
About a year after the Notice of Intent, the MMS publishes a Call
for Information in the Federal Register,291 which shows acreage desig-
nated by the MMS as being of geological or hydrocarbon potential. In
addition, the nominations of industry are sought for any part of the en-
tire planning area which may be of interest, excepting those parts already
deleted because of environmental unsuitability. The Call for Information
also solicits comments from the public on issues ranging from environ-
mental hazards to multiple use problems. When the comments from the
Call have been received and scrutinised, an Area Identification is
made.292 This decision by the Secretary is given on the basis of MMS
designations and industry nominations. Industry can thus be almost cer-
tain (barring the rejection of tracts later on in the process) that its desired
acreage will be available. "Areawide leasing," as it is called, reflects the
administration's desire to rely on industry expertise to develop the OCS.
The DEIS is completed after the Area Identification has taken place.
Although this documen't is prepared on the previously described area-
wide basis, it does try to focus on the areas selected by the Secretary at
the Area Identification stage.293 After a public review period, the FEIS
is published. Many planning areas were scheduled to be leased twice in
Secretary Watt's program. It was envisaged that the EIS for the second
sale would be able to utilise much of the information compiled in the first
sale, and subsequently collected by ongoing studies.294
288. Id.
289. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (1979).
290. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.34-1(a)(2)(i) (1983).
291. Id. § 256.23.
292. Id. § 256.26.
293. MINERALS MGMT. SERVICE, supra note 285, at 5.
294. See OCS Oversight-Part 2, supra note 234, at 233 (testimony of J. Robinson West).
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A Proposed Notice of Offering is then published, generally in the
same month as the FEIS.295 This cuts the pre-lease timetable by two
months. Moreover, the Department of Energy's sixty-day comment pe-
riod is now run concurrently with the statutory sixty-day period rather
than consecutively. 296 This results in another month being saved. Both
procedures are excellent examples of the concept of "telescoping," which
involves the idea of differing procedures being carried on simultaneously
instead of successively.
After the elapse of the comment period, a Notice of Sale is published
in the Federal Register.2 97 The sale itself can take place at any time more
than thirty days after the notice. The Department of the Interior no
longer undertakes tract evaluation for fair market value before a lease
sale. The new procedures reduce the average pre-lease period from forty-
two to twenty-one months.298
The main advantage accruing to industry from areawide leasing and
telescoping is that more quality acreage becomes available at a faster
pace. However, a number of other significant benefits were also projected
by Secretary Watt. First, it was hoped that the new procedures would
ensure that industry's resources would be channeled towards the most
prospective acreage.299 Mr. Watt considered it wasteful to concentrate
exploration in less desirable parts of the OCS. Second, if the Watt plan
was able to achieve its goal of increased exploration, additional offshore
data would become available to the oil industry. While not all drilling
results are open to market inspection, such data is often bought or
swapped. In this way risk would be reduced and further and more intel-
ligent offshore commitments would be encouraged. Under the old sys-
tem, industry had to have its geophysical or geological work completed
before the Call for Nominations if it wanted any of its desired acreage to
be included in the lease sale. But with the new, shorter pre-lease period,
planning deadlines have eased.3" The BLM's tendency to recommend
only a small percentage of nominated tracts for Tentative Tract Selection
wasted a great deal of corporate money on fruitless analysis.3" 1 With the
assurance that almost all industry nominations would now be accepted,
the likelihood of finances being wasted on geophysical or geological ex-
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See 30 C.F.R. § 256.32 (1983).
298. Kelly, supra note 271, at 70.
299. MINERALS MGMT. SERVICE, supra note 285, at 70.
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ploration receded. Finally, it was also envisaged that the practice of ac-
cepting for consideration a large majority of industry-nominated areas
would encourage innovative exploration strategies.30 2 Small companies,
for instance, often explore in an unorthodox fashion. It is important to
encourage such exploration because in many OCS areas all the structures
which can obviously harbor hydrocarbons have been penetrated. If oil
and gas exists in such areas (an example of which is the Baltimore Can-
yon), then it must lie in areas known as "obscure traps," reservoirs which
lack the standard features of normal petroleum deposits. Under the old
system, tracts with such reservoirs would not have attracted nominations
from the many companies using conventional exploration techniques,
and thus would never have been leased.
3. The Bidding System Under the OCSLAA
It was noted above that the OCSLAA authorises four basic types of
bid variables for OCS oil and gas leasing. 3 3 Soon after the enactment of
the OCSLAA, a controversy arose over the extent of the Secretary of the
Interior's discretion to select a single bid variable for constant use. In
Energy Action Educational Foundation v. Andrus,3° consumer groups,
two California state agencies, and a number of private individuals filed
for an injunction in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia against Secretary Andrus's continuing exclusive use of the
cash bonus as the OCS bid variable. The Department of the Interior
contended that it had complied with the requirement that at least twenty
percent of all OCS acreage to be leased must employ a system different
from the cash bonus bid with fixed royalty,3 5 by planning the promulga-
tion of regulations for other bid variables.30 6 But since the enactment of
the OCSLAA, no bid variable other than the cash bonus had been
used.30 7 Three days after suit was filed and just prior to a planned lease
sale, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction against the sales.308
302. AM. PET. INST., supra note 1, at 78.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 176-79.
304. 516 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C.), afid, 654 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Watt v.
Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151 (1981). For a more extensive discussion of the progres-
sive stages of the case, see Note, Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation: Secretarial Discre-
tion to Select Lease Bidding Systems, 3 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 163 (1983).
305. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(5)(B) (1982).
306. 516 F. Supp. at 94-95.
307. See Note, supra note 304, at 164-68.
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The district court refused the motion 0 9 and, on appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the lower court's
holding and remanded the case back to district court.3"0 On remand,
both parties sought a summary judgment, and plaintiffs again requested a
preliminary injunction. 11 The district court denied all of the motions3 12
and the plaintiffs appealed to the D.C. court of appeals. 313 The court of
appeals held that in light of the legislative history behind the OCSLAA,
it was impossible to conclude that the Secretary had been granted discre-
tion to ignore those options which did not rely on the front end cash
bonus as the bidding variable.314 The court believed that one of the most
important purposes of the OCSLAA had been to attempt to discover the
most desirable bidding variable, and that such a goal could only be ac-
complished by experimentation with bid variables other than the cash
bonus.315
The Department of the Interior consequently appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. While the appeal was pending the Reagan admin-
istration took office. When the Supreme Court eventually decided Watt
v. Energy Action Educational Foundation31 6 in favor of the petitioners, it
noted that the plain language of the statute clearly indicated that the
Secretary had discretion to exclusively utilise the cash bonus bid variable
in offshore leasing.317 The real limitation on the Secretary's discretion,
according to the Court, was that he could not use the cash bonus with
fixed royalty system for more than eighty percent of the total OCS lease
acreage. 318 The Court also pointed out that even this limitation had to be
qualified by language in section 11, which granted the Secretary the right
to override the latter provision if he determined that it was inconsistent
with the purposes and policies of the OCSLAA.3 19
The respondents, in turn, argued that the cash bonus bid variable
could not secure fair market value for OCS leases as required in section
18 of the OCSLAA.320 The Court rejected this line of reasoning by ob-
309. 479 F. Supp. at 63.
310. 631 F.2d at 761.
311. See 516 F. Supp. 90.
312. Id. at 98.
313. See 654 F.2d 735.
314. Id. at 747.
315. Id. at 746-47.
316. 454 U.S. 151.
317. Id. at 163.
318. Id.
319. Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(5)(B) (Supp. III 1979)).
320. 454 U.S. at 163-64.
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serving that since Congress had expressly required that forty percent of
all OCS acreage be leased under the cash bonus with fixed royalty sys-
tem, it could not have believed that the cash bonus method was incapable
of producing fair market value.321 Therefore, the Court's decision effec-
tively removed any doubts regarding the scope of the Secretary's discre-
tion in his choice of bidding systems.322
To fully comprehend the rationale of Secretary Watt's choice of
OCS bidding systems, it will be necessary to consider the pros and cons
of the four basic bid variables authorised by the OCSLAA.
a. The cash bonus bid
It was noted above that a cash bonus is a large, up-front payment for
an oil and gas lease.323 McDonald states that in economic terms a bonus
tends under competitive circumstances to be "the present value of ex-
pected net cash flow beyond the point of leasing. ' 324 The purchase of
offshore leases is always, to a greater or lesser extent, fraught with uncer-
tainty. In most cases it is impossible to determine at the pre-lease stage
whether there are hydrocarbons underlying the lease acreage. The size of
the bonus offered will therefore depend on the prospective lessee's per-
ception of the mineral value of the lease and the costs associated with it.
If bidders act in a state of uncertainty, widely varying offers will be re-
ceived, and hopefully the highest possible payment will be obtained.
Bonus bidding has a number of important negative and positive
characteristics. The main difficulty arises from the considerable initial
economic burden which is laid upon the lessee. The federal government
receives its up-front payment regardless of whether the tract is produc-
tive or not. It is the lessee who must put up the substantial monies neces-
sary for successful OCS bidding. The lessee corporation must then
attempt to recoup its costs from minerals which may or may not exist.
There can be no doubt that this aspect of the bonus system impairs the
capacity of small oil companies to compete in the market for OCS
leases.325
A more positive feature of the bonus bid is that it does not tend to
321. Id.
322. Id. at 163-65.
323. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
324. McDonald, The Economics of Alternative Leasing Systems on the Outer Continental Shelf,
18 Hous. L. REv. 967, 969 (1981).
325. For a more extensive coverage of the anti-competitive effect of bonus bidding, see id. at 972;
Jones, Mead, & Sorensen, supra note 112, at 895; McDonald, Federal Energy Resource Leasing
Policy, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 747, 751 (1978).
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affect post-lease development decisions.326 Once the up-front payment
has been made, the government receives no further revenue from the
lease operations, except the fixed royalty (or whatever happens to be the
fixed component of the leasing formula) and taxes. This constitutes a
strong reason to develop lease acreage diligently.32 7 The following exam-
ple will serve to illustrate this point. Suppose X, an oil and gas lessee,
pays fifty million dollars in bonus money for his lease; he further spends
five million dollars in exploration and development, and his well, which
has an estimated life of ten years, yields him two million dollars a year.
X will have a financial incentive to operate this well for ten years because
its production is reducing his previously incurred operating costs. The
bonus itself does not add to the cost of exploration and development, and
so further activity is encouraged. The bonus bid then, has both advan-
tages and disadvantages. The main disadvantage, the anti-competitive
effect mentioned above, was the main reason why Congress authorised
the other bid variables.12 8
b. The royalty bid
Unlike bonus bidding, the royalty method involves no large front
end payment. Instead, the federal government is offered a continuing
share in the gross value of production. The great advantage of the roy-
alty bid is that it increases participation in bidding.3 29 In October 1974,
DOI conducted an OCS lease sale using the royalty bid method. A later
analysis of the experiment concluded that "royalty bidding may bring
more bidders into OCS auctions. . . including more new bidders, and
may also make independents more competitive in the auctions."'330 It is
as easy for small corporations to bid high royalty rates as it is for large
corporations. Because the government receives no revenue till the lessee
finds and produces oil, the risks of the venture are more evenly spread.
The main defect inherent in royalty bidding is that the royalty tends
to become a burden on the future development of the lease.33 1 A rational
lessee will only produce that quantity of hydrocarbons which will leave
him with a profit after operating costs and royalties have been paid. If an
326. McDonald, supra note 324, at 970-71.
327. Id.
328. H.R. RP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 139, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1540, 1545.
329. See Jones, Mead, & Sorensen, supra note 112, at 897.
330. OFFICE OF OCS PROGRAM COORDINATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, AN ANALYSIS
OF THE ROYALTY BIDDING EXPERIMENT IN OCS SALE 36, at 18 (1977).
331. Jones, Mead, & Sorensen, supra note 112, at 897-99.
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operator has contracted to pay a high royalty rate to the government,
reserves which could otherwise be developed economically may be pre-
maturely abandoned. Royalty bids therefore tend to be high because it is
easy to make such a future commitment. The Department of the Inte-
rior, commenting on the above-mentioned 1974 royalty bidding experi-
ment, said, "[c]ompetitive bidding drives royalty rates to levels that
seriously erode the potential commercial value of a tract. ' 332 In fact,
commentators such as McDonald believe that the royalty method en-
courages speculative bidding.333
c. The profit share bid
This system differs from the royalty bid in that it uses as the bid
variable a share of net profits rather than a share in the value of gross
production. The profit share bid encourages participation for the same
reasons that the royalty bid does. Profit share bidding is also relevant to
post-lease investment, though it is not so likely to create an incentive to
abandon.334 This is because with profit share bidding, the government's
economic rent is a portion of whatever profit the lessee has made after
operating costs have been deducted from gross profits. Profit share bids,
however, tend, like royalty bids, to be high. Again, this is because it is
easy for corporations to commit themselves to paying high future shares
of net profits. California and the City of Long Beach have utilised this
system of bidding in oil and gas leasing of state and local waters.33 In
the case of Long Beach, the highest bid amounted to 95.56%.336 With
profit share bids for the best prospects reaching this level, many success-
ful bidders would be likely to channel future investment into more re-
warding projects. Still another problem with profit sharing lies in the
fashioning of an appropriate system for allocating costs between a com-
pany's various oil and gas operations, a notoriously difficult task.337
d. The work commitment bid
The work commitment bid is in some ways similar to the bonus bid.
It is based on a dollar amount pledge to undertake certain exploration.
332. OFFICE OF OCS PROGRAM COORDINATION, supra note 330, at 18.
333. See McDonald, supra note 324, at 974. For a further discussion of royalty bidding, see K.
DAM, supra note 6, at 148-53.
334. See McDonald, supra note 325, at 753.
335. Jones, Mead, & Sorensen, supra note 112, at 903,
336. Id.
337. For an enumeration of the problems involved, see id. at 901-02.
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Like the bonus bid it tends to reduce bid participation and, after the
stipulated exploration has been undertaken, becomes irrelevant to further
investment decisions. Its worst feature is not shared by any other sys-
tem. Specifically, if the lessee fails to complete his exploration pledge he
loses the dollar amount difference between his bid and his costs, and
therefore has an incentive to continue unprospective, wasteful explora-
tion in the hopes of finding something.338
4. The Watt Bidding Strategy
Secretary Watt's strategy was designed to utilise only the bonus bid
variable. The Secretary used the cash bonus bid with a stipulated sliding
scale royalty and fixed net profit share to fulfill his obligation to experi-
ment.339 He found that the bonus bid variable was the most appropriate
method to facilitate his goals of expanding exploration and production.
He relied on two factors, joint bidding and an increase in available acre-
age, to overcome its anti-competitive effects.
a. Joint bidding
This bidding scheme entails the submission of one bid for a tract by
two or more prospective lessees. Joint bidding has been a feature of OCS
lease sales since the early auctions in the 1950's. 3 ° The practice is the
means by which many small companies, who individually could not con-
template solo development of a tract, enter the OCS market. Joint bid-
ding, by spreading risks, increases participation and allows consortia to
put together the repertoire of differing offshore specialties such as drill-
ing, equipment maintenance, and chemical supply, which are essential
for proper development. In addition, it allows for widespread availability
of exploratory data, thus encouraging more corporations to consider bid-
ding.3"' Theoretically, joint bidding, with its element of "clubbing to-
gether," could actually decrease the number of bids. However, studies
tend to show that joint bidding, by attracting so many more bidders, has
actually increased competition.342 To ensure that the large multinational
338. For a further discussion of the work commitment bid, see id. at 904-05; McDonald, supra
note 325, at 754; McDonald, supra note 324, at 977-78.
339. See Note, supra note 304, at 168.
340. Grayson, Canaday, Brumbaugh, Sherman, & Sutherland, Issues of Competition on the Outer
Continental Shelf, 3 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 69, 92 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Grayson &
Sutherland].
341. For a further discussion of joint bidding, see id at 92-98; McDonald, supra note 324, at
979-80.
342. See Gilley, Karels, & Lyon, The Economics of Oil Lease Bidding, 18 Hous. L. REv. 1061
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corporations did not begin joint bidding among themselves and so gain
an unfair and anti-competitive advantage over the rest of the market, the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975311 provided that an oil com-
pany that has a daily production of over 1.6 million barrels cannot enter
into a joint bid with another company producing that amount.3 " The
Reagan administration has retained the ban. However, there is nothing
to stop a corporation affected by the statute from participating in a joint
bid with a smaller oil company.
b. The large increase in acreage available
It was mentioned above that the Watt plan entailed a dramatic ex-
pansion of lease offerings. The plan assumed that there would be a de-
mand for the mass of quality acreage on the market and that the bonus
rate would consequently fall: supply would outstrip hitherto unsatisfied
demand. As James Watt said, "[i]f you limit the acres available, then
you only allow a few companies to compete, and when two companies
join together to bid $333 million for 9 square miles of water, that forces
out a lot of other competition, ' 345 and "I would rather supply energy to
consuming Americans at a lower price than to simply restrict that to
allow a few companies to make big profits selling a little bit of oil."' 346
Because there would be so many available tracts, small companies would,
it was hoped, find it much easier to be successful in bidding. It was also
expected that the increase in leasing would further encourage joint bid-
ding.34 7 In fact, since so many of the lease sales were to be located in
difficult frontier areas, there would be considerable reason for even the
multinational corporations to cooperate with the smaller, more special-
ised companies. Moreover, because so much of the acreage would be
prospective, there would be a strong incentive for corporations to try to
(1981); Jones, Mead, & Sorensen, Free Entry into Crude Oil and Gas Production and Competition in
the US. OilIndustry, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J 859, 870-72 (1978); McDonald, supra note 324, at 980.
343. Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 10,
15, 30, 42, 50 U.S.C.).
344. Id § 105, 89 Stat. at 879-80; see 30 C.F.R. § 260.303 (1984). The American Petroleum
Institute disputes the contention that pre-1975 bidding was in some measure uncompetitive because
of joint bidding among the majors: "Studies have shown that. . . following imposition of the ban
.. . the number of bids per tract in frontier area OCS offerings dropped from 1.5 to 1.1 bids per
tract." Am. Pet. Inst., Response Paper (Nov. 10, 1982); see also Gilley, Karels, & Lyon, supra note
342, at 1070 (suggesting that competition is not lowered by joint bidding).
345. OCS Oversight-Part 2, supra note 234, at 59 (testimony of James Watt, Secretary of the
Interior).
346. Id. at 63.
347. See Grayson & Sutherland, supra note 340, at 100.
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spread their lease equity so as to be involved in as many discoveries as
possible.
The rejection of the other methods as bid variables was the result of
many of the reasons discussed in the analysis of each alternative. The
bonus system, it was believed, would encourage both efficient and ex-
haustive pre-lease exploration work and continuing post-lease develop-
ment. The royalty and net profits systems, however, would tend to
encourage speculative bidding and early abandonment. Both of these
methods would also result in extremely high bids being made for the very
best acreage348 and, therefore, would discourage the discoveries that both
government and industry hoped for. The work commitment system was
rejected partly because of its wasteful aspect, and partly because the idea
of government trying to maximise exploration before the optimum deci-
sion-making time (i.e., the post-lease stage) was reached was also con-
trary to Secretary Watt's market-oriented ethos. Work commitment
meant government involvement in, as opposed to government regulation
of, the oil industry.34 9
5. The New System of Tract Evaluation
Tract evaluation for fair market value is the process that the DOI
uses to ensure that bids for OCS tracts are not significantly lower than
the marketplace can afford. Evaluation was undertaken pursuant to the
old procedures on a tract specific basis before leasing took place.350 Since
only about half of the tracts offered were actually leased, many of the
evaluations were wasted.351 It would have been extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to continue this practice under the areawide leasing regime,
as there would have been far too many tracts for DOI to cope with, and
because less than half of these tracts would have been leased. New proce-
dures were adopted on February 22, 1983.352 Tract evaluation was
348. See OCS Oversight-Part 2, supra note 234, at 19 (testimony of Robert LeGassie, Acting
Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy, Dep't of Energy).
349. "[I]t is questionable whether government officials who must approve such leases are in a
position to determine the most efficient work program." Jones, Mead, & Sorensen, supra note 112,
at 904.
350. See OCS Oversight-Part 2, supra note 234, at 234 (statement of J. Robinson West, Assis-
tant Secretary for Policy, Budget and Administration, Dep't of the Interior).
351. Referring to this issue, Secretary Watt said, "I think my figures were that only about 47%
of those areas made available for lease were actually leased, so 53% of the lands surveyed, at tax-
payer's cost, were not leased by the corporations." OCS Oversight-Part 2, supra note 234, at 58
(testimony of James Watt, Secretary of Interior).
352. Letter from Secretary James G. Watt to Vice-President George Bush (March 1, 1983),
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switched from the pre-lease to the post-lease stage. The MMS now con-
ducts evaluations only on tracts which have received bids. But the
method as well as the timing of the evaluation has changed. The new
technique, like many of the other Watt procedures, is more market-ori-
ented. There is now a greater, though not exclusive, reliance on how
industry values tracts in the bidding process.
The new system has two phases.353 In Phase One all tracts which
are bid on are reviewed individually. All legal high bids are accepted on
tracts identified by the MMS as nonviable prospects. A legal high bid is
a bid of $150 or more per OCS acre.354 A lower bid will never be ac-
cepted under any circumstances. If a tract is designated as a develop-
ment or drainage tract, it will automatically be referred to Phase Two. 355
All legal high bids (after screening for anomalously low bids) for pro-
spective wildcat or proven tracts are accepted if the tract attracted three
or more bids or more than the average number of bids for prospective
tracts bid upon in the sale, whichever is more.356 If the prospective wild-
cat or proven tract bids fail this test, the bids are further scrutinised
under another method. If the geometric mean bid value for such a pro-
spective wildcat, or proven tract, is greater than the median of geometric
mean bid values of prospective wildcat and proven tracts bid on in the
sale, the bid will be accepted.357 If the bid fails this test it passes on to
Phase Two. It will be seen that this procedure for evaluating Phase One
bids relies on arithmetical analysis and industry consensus, rather than
on government surveying. The Department of the Interior estimated
that about fifty-five percent of all bids on prospective wildcat or proven
tracts would be accepted under Phase One.358 Phase One evaluation al-
353. See Letter from Dan Miller, Assistant Secretary, Energy and Minerals, United States Dep't
of the Interior, to Secretary James G. Watt (Feb. 18, 1983), reprinted in MINERALS MGMT. SER-
VICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PROCEDURES FOR OCS BID ADEQUACY (1983); Am. Pet.
Inst., New Procedures for Determining OCS Bid Adequacy (March 1983) (briefing paper).
354. MINERALS MGMT. SERVICE, supra note 285, at 103.
355. A "development tract" is a tract which has proven oil and gas deposits adjacent to it, but
not, so far as is known, under it. Am. Pet. Inst., supra note 353, at 4. A "drainage tract" is a tract
which might suffer drainage of hydrocarbons if wells were drilled nearly. Id.
356. Letter from Dan Miller, supra note 353. "Screening" is conducted using the "one-eighth
rule." Am. Pet. Inst., supra note 353, at 4. As an example of the way in which screening operates,
suppose that tract X receives three bids: the first bid is for $100 million, the second bid is for $80
million, and the third bid is for $1 million. The third bid will be eliminated because it is less than
one-eighth of the next highest bid. Thus, for the purposes of MMS calculations, only two bids would
be considered from tract X. A "prospective wildcat tract" is a tract in an area where no drilling has
taken place but geophysical or geological surveying has indicated possible reserves. Id. A "proven
tract" is a tract where it is known from previous drilling that hydrocarbons are present. Id. at 4-5.
357. Letter from Dan Miller, supra note 353.
358. Am. Pet. Inst., supra note 353, at 2.
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lows bids to be accepted about three days after a lease sale has been
held.359
Phase Two evaluation, a more complex process, is mainly done by
sampling analysis. About thirty percent of bids on a predetermined ba-
sis, and five percent on a random basis, receive the type of highly detailed
scrutiny (which may involve MMS geophysical or geological surveying)
that was applied to all offered tracts under the old procedure.3 ° The
results of this and other statistical evaluations are used by the MMS in
reaching their final decisions.
D. Objections to the Five- Year Plan
When Secretary Watt approved his new OCS plan in the summer of
1982, he encountered strident opposition 361 from some coastal states
(particularly California, Alaska, and Massachusetts), from environmen-
talists, and from fishermen and other coastal industries which might be
affected by the proposed program. There was also some concern among
consumer groups and the general public that the Watt proposals were
selling the country's resources at a discount.
A major fear was that the dramatic increase in available acreage
caused by the extensive lease sales and areawide leasing would pose a
grave environmental threat. Senator Edward Kennedy asserted that the
program underestimated" 'the potential for significant damage to the en-
vironment.' ,362 Elizabeth R. Kaplan, Legislative Director of Friends of
the Earth, commenting on areawide environmental analysis, said, "the
impact of such a system on California could be very serious, but on
Alaska it would be catastrophic.1 363 States and local governments, it
was believed, could not adequately plan for such an expansion.
Another serious complaint was that the expedited leasing program
would flood the market with leases and drive bonuses down, a problem
likely to be exacerbated by the termination of the thorough tract evalua-
tion procedures of the past. It was also felt that the dropping price of oil
would tend to discourage companies from expending large amounts of
capital on OCS bidding. As Senator Howard Metzenbaum remarked, "if
we want to get a fair return for our oil and gas resources, this is not the
359. Letter from Dan Miller, supra note 353.
360. Id.
361. See Kelly, supra note 271, at 70-78.
362. Id. at 76.
363. Kaplan, supra note 66, at 25.
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market. , 364
California, Alaska, and various environmental groups eventually
filed suit against the Watt program in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in California v. Watt3 65 (Watt 1). In Watt I,
the petitioners contested Secretary Watt's interpretation of section 18 of
the OCSLAA.366 The D.C. Court of Appeals agreed with the contention
that Secretary Watt had misinterpreted section 18, and therefore ordered
that the Watt leasing plan be revised in accordance with the OC-
SLAA.367 In California v. Watt368 (Watt I1), the same petitioners chal-
lenged the adequacy of the analysis used by the Secretary in the revised
plan.369 Although all of the petitioners' claims were eventually dis-
missed, two of the arguments advanced nevertheless merit special atten-
tion. One argument relates to areawide leasing, while the other relates to
fair market value.
Section 18(a) of the OCSLAA requires the Secretary of the Interior
to develop a "schedule of proposed lease sales indicating as precisely as
possible the size, timing, and location of leasing activity. ' 370 The peti-
tioners in Watt II argued that the plan lacked specificity because MMS
had made it clear that only certain sections of each area designated in the
five-year program would actually be leased.371 This argument was re-
jected by the court because the Secretary could not know what parts of a
planning area would be leased before a Call for Information and subse-
quent procedures could be carried out.372 Section 18(a) only required as
much specificity "as possible. ' 37 3 The petitioners also contended that the
sheer size of the planning areas meant that it was impossible to indicate
with any degree of exactitude the size of the offerings.3 74 But the court of
appeals, referring to the OCSLAA, said that the plain words of the stat-
ute merely required that the size as known at the program stage be given
364. Watt Defends Five Year Leasing Program on OCS, OIL & GAS J., Sept. 13, 1982, at 48, 48-
49.
365. 668 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
366. Id. at 1302-22.
367. Id. at 1326.
368. 712 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See generally Kelly, Court ruling supports OCS leasing plan,
OFFSHORE, Oct. 1983, at 56 (discussing the practical effects of the case); Smyth, A Further Analysis
of Section 18 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: California v. Watt, a Common Sense Inter-
pretation, 16 NAT. REsOURCEs L. NEWSLETTER 1 (1983); Comment, supra note 263, at 104-12.
369. Id. at 590-612.
370. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1982).
371. 712 F.2d at 590.
372. Id. at 591-94.
373. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1982).
374. 712 F.2d at 592.
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as precisely as possible.375 There was nothing to limit the size if it was
given to the best of the Secretary's knowledge.376
The petitioners went on to submit that the Secretary had violated
the provisions of section 18(a) by delegating to industry the responsibility
for tract selection.37 7 This argument was also unsuccessful. The court
reasoned that the OCSLAA, a pyramidic statute, was designed to elicit
input from parties having an interest in OCS development. 378 The Call
for Information, which attempts to elicit comments from states, local
governments, and others, as well as industry, was a legitimate example of
OCS participation.379 With the dismissal of these arguments, areawide
leasing was effectively given judicial approval.
Another major legal challenge was mounted by the petitioners on
the basis of section 18(a)(4) of the OCSLAA, which requires the Secre-
tary to lease OCS lands in a fashion that assures fair market value.38°
Because the term "fair market value" for the purposes of section 18 is not
defined in the OCSLAA, the Secretary adopted the common law defini-
tion, which holds that fair market value is the price that a knowledgeable
and willing seller would accept from a knowledgeable and willing, but
not obligated, buyer.381 The petitioners also suggested that the large ex-
pansion in available tracts would reduce the bonus per acre rate,382 a
situation the Secretary was quite prepared to accept as the probable re-
sult of his program.383
The court found that the petitioners' concept of fair market value
merely focused on the size of the bonuses and the goal of obtaining maxi-
mum up-front revenue.384 But this was not the same thing as fair market
value. Included in the latter notion was the concept of socially optimal
supply. The court believed that the supply of leases under the Watt pro-
gram would satisfy competitive demand.385 The court further noted that
despite the administration's heavy reliance on market competition to pro-
375. Id.
376. Id. at 592-93.
377. Id. at 593.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 593-94.
380. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(4) (1982).
381. 712 F.2d at 606. Although in actuality there is a definition of "fair market value" in the
OCSLAA, this definition relates only to the sale of minerals reduced to ownership. See 43 U.S.C.
§ 1331(0) (1982).
382. 712 F.2d at 606-08.
383. See supra text accompanying notes 345-49.
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vide fair market value, Secretary Watt had retained a system of post-lease
tract evaluation. 386 Thus, despite the petitioners' attack on its adequacy,
it could not be conclusively shown that the new tract evaluation method
was unreasonable.
The court might have added that another important factor built into
Secretary Watt's concept of fair market value was the measure of return
for government from the fixed component (usually a 162/3% royalty) of
lease bids and taxes.387 These returns depend on discoveries and produc-
tion - the central objectives of the new offshore regime. The MMS esti-
mates that only twenty-five percent of future OCS revenues will come
from bonuses,388 and that seventy-five percent will be derived from royal-
ties and taxes. The DOI forecasts that the ratio may be even higher in
frontier areas.389
E. The Effect of the Environmental Statutes on the Watt Plan
It was mentioned above that the environmental statutes were a ma-
jor factor in the failure of the proposed expedited OCS programs of the
1970's.391 The Reagan administration did not make any substantial
changes in this legislation, even though the Watt program proposed a
dramatic increase in the leasing of frontier areas of the OCS. As many of
the states adjacent to these frontier waters had a history of environmental
consciousness, it would have been surprising if the states and their resi-
dent environmentalists had not used statutes such as NEPA, CZMA,
and ESA to attempt to slow the pace of the new lease offerings.
It has already been noted that NEPA plays an integral role in the
OCS pre-lease process. 391 It also has a role in the post-lease stage. If the
MMS feels that the approval of exploration, or development and produc-
tion plans, constitutes a "major federal action" then an EIS must be pre-
pared with respect to the relevant tracts.392 The CEQ had also
386. Id.
387. See MINERAIS MGMT. SERVICE, supra note 285, at 98-100; Palmer & Kelly, supra note
235, at 243-46.
388. Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales and the Department of the Interior's 5-Year Leasing
Plan: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations and the Subcomm. on
Mines and Mining of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Ses-
sions, 153 (1984) (testimony of David Russell, Deputy Director, Minerals Mgmt. Service).
389. See Palmer & Kelly, supra note 235, at 244.
390. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 280-298 and accompanying text.
392. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982). "At least once the Secretary shall declare the approval of a
development and production plan in any area or region (as defined by the Secretary) of the outer
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promulgated regulations establishing "tiering" before the election of the
Reagan administration.393 After the 1980 case of North Slope Borough v.
Andrus,3 94 the legality of tiering was no longer in doubt. Accordingly,
later NEPA challenges tended to be based on the adequacy of the EIS.
In Massachusetts v. Watt,395 for instance, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit affirmed a lower court judgment holding that
the FEIS for Lease Sale 52 was insufficient to meet legal standards. 96 In
the lower court ruling it was determined that the EIS cost-benefit analy-
sis had been undertaken on the basis of there being reserves of 1.73 bil-
lion barrels of oil and 5.25 trillion cubic feet of gas in the planning
area.397  Exploratory drilling from another earlier lease sale, however,
had indicated that this estimate was probably twenty times too large.398
This information was merely included by way of addendum in the FEIS
for Lease Sale 52.3 9 9 Based upon these lower court findings, the court of
appeals held that such an FEIS would defeat NEPA's purpose of ensur-
ing that federal decisions are taken after their potential environmental
consequences have been properly scrutinised.'
The litigation caused by the CZMA4°1 was finally resolved by the
United States Supreme Court in Secretary of the Interior v. California,' 2
a case which arose out of Lease Sale 53. The fourth lease sale of Secre-
393. See 40 C.F.IL § 1502.20 (1984).
394. 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
395. 716 F.2d 946 (Ist Cir. 1983), affig 560 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass. 1983). For a pre-1980 case
upholding the adequacy of an EIS prepared by the DOI for exploration of the Mid-Atlantic OCS, see
County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977). For a discussion of the
implications of County of Suffolk, see Casenote, Offshore Oil Development and the Demise of NEPA,
7 B.C. ENVTh. Ax. L. REv. 83 (1978); Casenote, Standards of Adequacy for an EISfor Offshore
Leasing, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 667 (1978).
396. 716 F.2d at 953.
397. Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561, 569 (D. Mass.), aff'd sub nom. Massa-
chusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983).
398. Id. at 569-70.
399. Id.
400. 716 F.2d at 952-53.
401. For a further discussion of CZMA issues, see Berger & Saurenman, The Role of Coastal
States in Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing: A Litigation Perspective, 3 VA. J. NAT. RE-
SOURCES L. 35 (1983); Deller, Federalism and Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing: Must Federal Tract
Selections and Lease Stipulations Be Consistent With State Coastal Zone Management Programs?, 14
U.C.D. L. REV. 105 (1980); Harvey, Federal Consistency and OCS Oil and Gas Development: A
Review and Assessment of the "Directly Affecting" Controversy, 13 OcEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 481
(1984); Moore, Outer Continental Shelf Development and Recent Applications of the Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1971, 15 TULSA L.J. 443 (1980); Comment, Offshore Federalism: Evolving Fed-
eral-State Relations in Offshore Oil and Gas Development, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 401 (1984); Comment,
Application of the Coastal Zone Management Act to Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales, 6 HARv.
ENvTL. L. REv. 159 (1982); Casenote, supra note 263, at 550-58; Comment, supra note 263, at 112-
40.
402. 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
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tary Andrus's five-year program, Lease Sale 53 was scheduled to be held
for the Central and North Californian OCS in May 1981. California has,
pursuant to the CZMA, an approved California Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Plan (CCZMP), which is administered by the California Coastal
Commission (CCC). °3 In July 1980, the CCC requested Secretary An-
drus to submit a consistency determination in accordance with section
307(c)(1) to the effect that Lease Sale 53 was in conformity with the
CCZMP. 40 In October, the Secretary replied that since Lease Sale 53
had no "direct effects" on California, no determination was required.405
When Secretary Watt took over in early 1981 the CCC addressed the
same request to him. Again, the response received by the CCC was nega-
tive. On April 29, 1981, California filed for an injunction against the
lease sale in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California." 6
The district court allowed for the acceptance and opening of the
bids, but not for the awarding of leases. A preliminary injunction which
prevented the DOI from accepting or rejecting the submitted offers was
granted in May of 1981.1' District Judge Pfaelzer's full opinion of Au-
gust 18 focused on interpreting the words "directly affecting" as used in
section 307(c)(1) of the CZMA. 40 8 The Secretary maintained that "di-
rectly affecting" was used in the CZMA in a straightforward physical
context and therefore was intended to encompass "effects resulting from
an activity without an intervening cause." 9 If this interpretation was
correct, OCS leasing would indeed have no direct effect on a coastal zone
because various post-lease procedures were necessary before any drilling
could occur. California contended that "directly affecting" could refer to
wider social and economic effects resulting from the choice of tracts and
lease conditions or stipulations which are adopted at the leasing stage.41°
Judge Pfaelzer agreed with the plaintiffs' perspective of section
307(c)(1) and held that the section was ambiguous.4" Judge Pfaelzer
further found that the legislative purpose of the CZMA had been to en-
able the coastal states to effectively plan for OCS oil and gas develop-
403. See Comment, supra note 38, at 799-801.
404. California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359, 1366 (C.D. Cal. 1981), affid, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.
1982), rev'd sub nom. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
405. Id. at 1366-67.
406. Id. at 1367.
407. See id.
408. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (1982).
409. 520 F. Supp. at 1378.
410. See Casenote, supra note 263, at 554-55.
411. 520 F. Supp. at 1368-69.
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ments.41 2 It was at the leasing stage that "critical decisions are made as
to the size and location of the tracts, the timing of the sale and the stipu-
lations to which the leases are subject. '41 3 If the "physically affecting"
test of the DOI had been correct, the states would only be "consulted
after the plans are drawn and the parameters for exploration and devel-
opment are set." 4 14
An issue the court did not address directly was who, given the cor-
rectness of California's case, was to be the judge of what constituted "to
the maximum extent practicable"? Section 307(c)(3), which deals with
consistency with respect to exploration and development and production
plans, provides that the state, or in certain circumstances, the Secretary
of Commerce, may decide.415 But no such procedures are included in
section 307(c)(1). 416 Judge Pfaelzer's remedy, however, cast some light
on her concept of the resolution of this issue. She invalidated leases
awarded with respect to certain tracts which, according to California,
could not be leased consistently with the CCZMP. Specifically, she held
that these tracts could not be leased till all the requirements of the
CCZMP had been met.4 17 The implication of this reasoning was that it
was up to state authorities to decide what constituted "to the maximum
extent practicable." Had this interpretation of the CZMA been accepted,
states having CZMP's would then have had very significant influence
over the exploration and development of the OCS. Accordingly, the
DOI appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. Pending the appeal, the DOI's policy in dealing with OCS
lease sales was to regard the Secretary's literal analysis of section
307(c)(1) as being correct.418
The Ninth Circuit decided the case in much the same fashion as the
district court.4 19 Although the views and legislative interpretation of
Judge Pfaelzer were affirmed, the issue of jurisdiction to decide maxi-
mum practicability provoked a disagreement with the district court's
finding that a state's perception of consistency should "ultimately be con-
trolling."42 The court of appeals believed that if the state refused to
412. Id. at 1369.
413. Id. at 1371 (footnote omitted).
414. Id.
415. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3) (1982).
416. See id § 1456(c)(1).
417. 520 F. Supp. at 1389.
418. Berger & Saurenman, supra note 401, at 61-62.
419. California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), affig 502 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981),
rev'd sub nom. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
420. Id. at 1266.
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concur with the Secretary of the Interior's consistency determination, the
disagreement should be referred to the Secretary of Commerce pursuant
to the procedures laid down in section 307(c)(3)(B). 421 The court thus
held that section 307(c)(3)(B) procedures applied to section 307(c)(1).122
Reflecting its difference with the judgment of the district court, the
Ninth Circuit varied the latter's remedy. The invalidation of the bids
was overturned and Lease Sale 53 was enjoined with respect to the con-
tested tracts till the outcome of the submission of DOI's consistency de-
termination became apparent.423 The Secretary of the Interior appealed
again, this time to the Supreme Court.
Secretary of the Interior v. California424 was decided by the United
States Supreme Court on January 11, 1984. Justice O'Connor, who
wrote for the majority, found, as had both lower courts, that section
307(c)(1) was ambiguous. 2 Recourse had to be made to the legislative
history of the CZMA. The Court reasoned that under a strict reading of
the legislative history, the key to understanding "directly affecting" was
to analyse the geographic extent of the "coastal zone. '4 26 Federal lands,
including parks, military installations, and Indian reservations lying on
or near the coast, are not coastal lands for CZMA purposes because of
their federal ownership. Therefore, the purpose of section 307(c)(1), the
Court believed, was to ensure that federal activities in those enclaves
were, to "the maximum extent practicable," in conformity with the state
CZMP.427 Section 307(c)(1), the Court held, was never intended to ap-
ply to the OCS.428 Consequently, the Supreme Court's decision means
that there is now no mandatory CZMA pre-lease procedure.
It has also been observed that the ESA, because of its strong sub-
stantive and procedural provisions, is one of the most potent environ-
mental statutes.42 9 The ESA's substantive requirements could cause
particular difficulty for expedited OCS leasing because lucrative frontier
areas such as California, Alaska, and the Georges Bank have a very wide
variety of wildlife. Indeed, this is particularly true of Alaska, a key to the
Watt program. But problems in ESA compliance comprehend a wider
421. Id. at 1265-66.
422. Id. at 1266.
423. Id. at 1266-67.
424. 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
425. Id. at 662-63.
426. Id. at 662.
427. Id. at 672.
428. Id. at 666, 672.
429. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
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scope than the large variety of wildlife; they also extend to the complex-
ity of differing ecosystems. According to Elizabeth Kaplan, "[s]o little is
known about the living resources of the 30,000 miles of pristine Alaskan
coast and its waters that it would be impossible to assess the impacts of
drilling in much of the OCS."430
These concerns became the object of litigation in Village of False
Pass v. Watt.4 3  Lease Sale 70, relating to the St. George Basin area of
the Alaskan OCS, had been planned for February 1983. A number of
local Alaskan residents, fishermen, and environmentalists challenged the
sale, arguing that Lease Sale 70 was in violation of the ESA.4 32 The Sec-
retary had, they submitted, failed to use all methodologies and proce-
dures to ensure that there would be no likelihood of jeopardy to
whales. 33 Although it was later found that there was insufficient infor-
mation available to determine whether offshore activity would be likely
to endanger the whales, pre-lease studies had shown that two possible
dangers arose in the form of oil spillages and noise pollution. The United
States District Court for the District of Alaska held that while the Secre-
tary had taken all steps appropriate at the leasing stage to minimise the
risk from oil spills, he had not taken adequate measures to deal with
noise pollution.434 The Secretary's main failure was that he neglected to
ensure that the whales would be as safe as possible from the adverse ef-
fects of pre-exploration, but post-lease, seismic work.43 The court or-
dered that leases should not be awarded for Lease Sale 70 OCS tracts
until the Secretary had remedied this defect.4 36
While the ESA does not require that a decision be halted if environ-
mental analysis indicates a lack of information, section 7(d) prohibits any
irretrievable commitment which might later foreclose alternative courses
of action facilitating compliance with section 7(a)(2).4 37 Pre-lease biolog-
ical assessments may often return a verdict of insufficient information in
430. Kaplan, supra note 66, at 25.
431. 565 F. Supp. 1123 (D. Alaska 1983), affid, 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984).
432. Id. at 1159.
433. The ESA does not expressly require that federal agencies use all methodologies and proce-
dures to avoid jeopardy to endangered species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1982). Such a requirement,
however, has resulted from earlier interpretations of the Act. See, eg., Roosevelt Campobello Inter-
national Park v. E.P.A., 684 F.2d 1041, 1049 (1st Cir. 1982) (agency has duty to use "all methods
and procedures which are necessary. . . to prevent the loss of any endangered species, regardless of
the cost.").
434. 565 F. Supp. at 1161-62.
435. Id. at 1162-63.
436. Id. at 1165-66.
437. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (1982).
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the Alaskan OCS. If the envisaged lease sales are held, a very difficult
question may arise as to whether subsequent federal approval of explora-
tion, or development and production plans, would constitute an irretriev-
able commitment within the meaning of section 7(d) of the ESA.
The environmental statutes are undoubtedly a major influence in
contemporary OCS leasing. NEPA, for example, is a cornerstone of the
offshore planning process. The statutes have also caused a significant
amount of litigation. But opponents of the Reagan administration's OCS
plans have not been able to use the environmental legislation to disem-
body the expansion program. The large scale delays and cancellations of
the 1970's have not, on the whole, been repeated. Court challenges have,
at the time of writing, resulted in the cancellation of only one lease sale
so far in this decade.43 However, environmental litigation has caused a
considerable number of delays and tract deletions. This has been partic-
ularly true of the Californian OCS where every lease sale of this decade
has been delayed.439 But the principal issue in the Californian litigation
was the meaning of section 307(c)(1) of the CZMA. This question has
now been finally resolved in favor of DOI. Two of the four Alaskan lease
sales have been delayed for short periods. In addition, leases have now
been awarded for Lease Sale 704" (St. George Basin). Two out of the
three Atlantic sales have passed without incident, though Lease Sale 52
was cancelled. Not a single environmental challenge has been mounted
against Gulf of Mexico lease sales since the inception of the present ad-
ministration."4 All told, this is not a record of excessive disruption. In-
deed, it is the recent actions of Congress which have proven much more
disruptive.
F. Important Legislative Developments and Issues
The concerns of coastal states have been addressed not only in the
courts but also in the Congress. Three topics of particular relevance to
the goals of the Reagan administration-lease moratoria, coastal revenue
sharing, and CZMA consistency-are dealt with below.
438. The cancelled lease sale was Lease Sale 52. See supra notes 395-400 and accompanying
text.
439. Lease Sales 53, 68, and 73 were delayed pending litigation relating to CZMA consistency
issue. For the effects of the litigation on the first two sales, see Berger & Saurennan, supra note 401,
at 37-66. Lease Sale 80 was delayed because of the congressional moratoria. See infra notes 442-58
and accompanying text.
440. See Rintoul, Operators to Begin Bering Sea Drilling, OFFSHORF, June 1984, at 35, 36.
441. Louisiana did, however, unsuccessfully attempt to enjoin Lease Sale 81 (Central Gulf) on
the basis of the OCSLAA. See Louisiana v. Clark, No. 84-1886 (E.D. La. April 23, 1984).
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Congressional opponents of the Watt program have in the last four
years attempted to include provisions in the yearly DOI appropriations
bills which would exclude funding for offshore leasing in certain parts of
the OCS. These efforts have met with increasing success. In fiscal year
1982, 736,000 acres of the OCS were put off limits for oil and gas leas-
ing.' 2 Funding was withheld for leasing activities relative to thirty-six
million acres for fiscal year 1983.443 The leasing moratoria were further
extended for fiscal year 1984, when President Reagan signed the DOI
appropriations bill for that year, H.R. 3363, into law on November 4,
1983.44 As enacted, H.R. 3363 severely restricted or curtailed finances
for Lease Sale 79 (Eastern Gulf of Mexico)," 5 Lease Sale 80 (Southern
California),4 6 and Lease Sale 82 (North Atlantic). 4 7 Thus despite the
lobbying efforts of the oil industry," 8 the moratoria relating to fiscal year
1984 effectively excluded more than fifty-two million acres from sched-
uled lease sales.449 The DOI appropriations bill for fiscal year 1985 con-
tinued to restrict or curtail finances for Lease Sale 80450 and Lease Sale
82.451
The recent OCS leasing moratoria have dealt a considerable blow to
the administration's offshore goals. Both DOI and the oil industry are
particularly concerned with the effect on access to the lucrative Pacific
OCS.452 In fiscal year 1984, thirty-seven million acres were withdrawn
from the Californian OCS.453  This withdrawal amounts to eighty-five
percent of the entire federal offshore area adjacent to California.a54 The
MMS estimates that OCS areas affected by the 1984 moratoria contain
442. AM. PET. INST., supra note 1, at 18.
443. Id.
444. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-146, 97 Stat. 919 (1983).
445. Id. § 109, 97 Stat. at 936-37.
446. Id. § 113, 97 Stat. at 938.
447. Id. § 108, 97 Stat. at 934-36.
448. Talk by John McMahon, Senior Counsel for Shell Offshore, Inc., American Bar Associa-
tion Meeting in New Orleans (Nov. 1983).
449. AM. PET. INST., supra note 1, at 18.
450. Continuing Appropriations, 1985-Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, § 111, 98 Stat. 1837, 1855-56 (1984).
451. Id. § 108, 98 Stat. at 1853-55.
452. See generally Oil and Gas in Washington, WORLD OIL, Feb. 1, 1984, at 23 (noting that
recent OCS sales, particularly Lease Sale 73, have been relatively unsuccessful).
453. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1985: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appro-
priations-Part 5, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 472 (1984) (statement of Paul L. Kelly, Vice-President of
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1.35 billion barrels of oil equivalent, 455 and that revenues from lost bo-
nuses would have amounted to $372 million.4 5 6 The American Petro-
leum Institute projects that if the present restrictions are continued for
five years, United States oil production will be reduced by 124,000 bar-
rels a day by 1993.4s7 Conflicting signals concerning OCS leasing now
emanate from Congress. The OCSLAA requires an expedited offshore
program with "an equitable sharing of developmental benefits and envi-
ronmental risks among the various regions, ' 458 yet the moratoria, on the
contrary, put significant sections of the OCS out of bounds.
A second important legislative issue is the concept of coastal reve-
nue sharing.4 59 Coastal states have, as has been noted above, mineral
jurisdiction over their own state waters, which usually extends for three
miles."" But coastal states do not receive any revenue from bonuses,
royalties, or taxes accruing from OCS oil and gas. This revenue goes to
the federal government,461 even though the main social and economic
effects of OCS development are on adjacent coasts. Against the back-
drop of the Watt program with its expanded lease sales, representatives
from coastal states again began to question the division of offshore reve-
nues. A development which contributes to this phenomenon is the fact
that federal funding for approved state CZMP's and Coastal Energy Im-
pact Programs (CEIP) is being phased out.462
Various bills introduced into Congress over the last few years have
unsuccessfully attempted to legislate particular revenue sharing schemes.
The Ocean and Coastal Resources Management and Development Block
Grant Act of 1982,46 for example, would have provided coastal states
with finances designed to boost the faltering CZMP and CEIP schemes,
as well as the National Sea Grant Program. Ten percent of all federal
455. Id
456. Id. at 472-73.
457. Am. PFT. INsT., supra note 1, at 27.
458. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2)(B) (1982).
459. See generally Comment, Outer Continental Shelf Revenue Sharing for Coastal States, 3 VA.
J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 131 (1984) (exploring the ramifications of the OCSLAA on state revenue
sharing).
460. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
461. An exception to this rule occurs when a reservoir underlies both state and federal offshore
lands. If federal leasing results in hydrocarbons being drained from state tracts, then a procedure is
available to ensure that the state can obtain a "fair and equitable" percentage of federal revenues.
See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(g) (1982).
462. The CEIP is an additional federal funding program designed to help assist coastal states
cope with OCS energy impacts. See Pub. L. No. 95-372, §§ 501-04, 92 Stat. 629, 660 (1980) (codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1456-56a (1982)); see also Miller, supra note 401, at 422-24 (discussing the CEIP
and recent Congressional attempts to devise OCS revenue sharing).
463. H.R. 5543, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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revenues from new OCS developments starting from a base year of 1982,
and up to a maximum of $300 million,4 " would have been allocated to a
special block grant fund known as the Ocean and Coastal Resources
Management and Development Fund.4 65 This fund would have been di-
vided between the coastal states on the basis of concentration of OCS
activity.4 66 Substantially similar bills were also unsuccessfully intro-
duced in 1983467 and 1984.468
The stance of industry has been to support coastal revenue shar-
ing.469 Industry has hoped that if states like California and Alaska are
given a financial stake in the development of the OCS then much of the
current opposition will recede.470 The Reagan administration, however,
is opposed to the concept 471 since, in this time of financial deficits, the
Treasury needs all of the OCS revenues that can possibly be obtained.472
Lastly, the recent decision of the Supreme Court relative to the
proper interaction between CZMA consistency and federal OCS oil and
gas leasing473 has prompted representatives of coastal states to respond
with the introduction of remedial legislation in Congress. H.R. 4589,474
introduced by Representatives D'Amours, Panetta, and Studds, and S.
2324,471 introduced by Senator Packwood, would have required that
OCS lease sales be made consistent with state CZMP's. 76 As might be
expected, the DOI was strongly opposed to these suggested measures.
Speaking against both bills in March 1984, the Director of the MMS,
William D. Bettenberg, said, "[t]he proposed legislation would set state
interests above national interests, cause conflicts rather than resolve them
and impose inordinate administrative and litigative burdens on federal
agencies. " 477
464. Id. § 3(b)(1), (2).
465. Id. § 3(a).
466. For a further discussion of H.R. 5543, see Comment, supra note 459, at 155-60.
467. See H.R. 5, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
468. S. 2463, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
469. Palmer & Kelly, supra note 235, at 249-52.
470. Talk by John McMahon, supra note 448.
471. Comment, supra note 459, at 158-60.
472. Palmer & Kelly, supra note 235, at 250.
473. See supra notes 424-28 and accompanying text.
474. H.R. 4589, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
475. S. 2324, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). For further details concerning both bills, see Am.
PET. INST., supra note 1, at 84-86; Comment, supra note 263, at 140.
476. See Davis, Senate Commerce Moves Bill on Offshore Leasing Actions, 42 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP. 1138 (1984).
477. See AM. PET. INST., supra note 1, at 85-86.
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G. A New Secretary and Some Changes
In October 1983 Secretary Watt resigned. His successor, William P.
Clark, took office on November 21. Previously, Mr. Clark had been Na-
tional Security Advisor to the President. Upon assuming the Office of
Secretary of the Interior, William Clark was instructed by the President
to undertake a thorough evaluation of DOI's OCS policy.47 In Decem-
ber he made certain organisational changes,479 and in January 1984 he
delivered a major statement on policy.4 80 Secretary Clark focused on the
security risk associated with foreign oil imports and the economic waste
involved in sending billions of dollars abroad. 81 OCS oil and gas, he
believed, was the best available opportunity to rectify the trend of foreign
reliance. His policy for the federal offshore was the same as that estab-
lished by Congress in 1978: to simultaneously expedite development and
protect the environment.4 82 He announced a general satisfaction with
the market-oriented alterations in the OCS leasing process for which Sec-
retary Watt had been responsible: "The basic concept of areawide con-
sideration still has validity-there is no reason to depart from it at this
time.
4 83
Secretary Clark's approach in implementing these policies, however,
turned out to be somewhat, though not substantially, different from his
predecessor. The main differences were reflected in the pre-lease proce-
dure and lease offerings. While areawide leasing was maintained, certain
refinements were also made. Industry was asked to identify areas of in-
terest with much more specificity at the Call for Information stage. The
process of "scoping" was upgraded, and an increased number of public
meetings were established to review the DEIS. Secretary Clark hoped
that these changes would facilitate the resolution of most disputes by the
time that Area Identification decisions were made.484 Tract evaluation
478. See Matthews, Clark makes positive moves at Interior, OFFSHORE, May 1984, at 151, 155-
56.
479. Id. at 151.
480. Remarks of Secretary William Clark to the United States Dep't of the Interior OCS Policy
Committee, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 12, 1984).
481. Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Activities" Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Con-
servation and Supply of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 74-
75 (1984) (statement of William Clark, Secretary of the Interior) [hereinafter cited as Hearing],
482. "Our OCS policy must and will remain as stated by Congress in 1978. We are committed
to expeditiously exploring the OCS and to encouraging production while protecting the ocean and
the coastal environment." Id. at 79.
483. Id.
484. See Briefing by the Secretary of the Interior: Before the House Comm. on Interior and Insu-
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was undertaken in a somewhat stricter fashion, with more high bids be-
ing rejected at Phase One.485 Despite the fact that the Supreme Court in
Secretary of the Interior v. California held that the consistency require-
ment of the CZMA does not relate to OCS lease sales,486 Secretary Clark
continued to elicit at the pre-lease stage the opinion of coastal state au-
thorities on the probable interaction between future exploration and de-
velopment, and the provisions of any approved CZMP. This information
was sought at the Call for Information.487
After consultations with the Alaskan congressional delegation and
the Governor of Alaska it was decided that Lease Sale 85 (Barrow Arch)
would be cancelled.488 About eighty percent of Lease Sale 92 (North
Aleutian Basin) has been deleted because of that area's importance to the
fishing industry.489 Half of the acreage to be offered in Lease Sale 87
(Diapir Field) was deferred to future sales.490 The major reason underly-
ing this deletion was the relatively low estimated hydrocarbon potential
of the tracts in question. The appropriations moratoria, as well as inter-
national boundary, fishing, and military concerns, have been responsible
for delaying Lease Sale 80 and Lease Sale 82491 (Southern California and
the North Atlantic).
Author's Note: In the wake of President Reagan's landslide reelection, a
new Secretary of the Interior, Donald Hodel, was appointed in the fall of
1984. In the spring of 1985, Secretary Hodel released details of a new
five-year oil and gas leasing program. The program contains proposals
for thirty-three lease sales, five frontier exploration sales, and five supple-
mental sales.49 2 With the exceptions of the central and western Gulf of
Mexico, which will continue to have annual sales, the other fifteen areas
selected for leasing will have triennial sales.49 3 A commitment has also
been made to concentrate on leasing better quality acreage. The poten-
tial effects of this latter decision on areawide leasing are still unknown.
One of the innovations in the proposed five-year program, the fron-
485. Conversation with John McMahon, Senior Counsel for Shell Offshore, Inc., in New Orleans
(Sept. 12, 1984).
486. See supra notes 424-28 and accompanying text.
487. Briefing, supra note 484, at 147.
488. See Hearing, supra note 481, at 93.
489. See id.
490. Id.
491. See id. at 93-94; see also supra notes 446-51 and accompanying text (chronicling the effects
of the leasing moratoria).




Vass: A Comparison of American and British Offshore Oil Development dur
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1985
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
tier exploration sale, allows the DOI to respond to oil embargoes, rising
oil prices, or large new OCS discoveries with an enhanced degree of flexi-
bility.4 94 All five of the exploration sales are located in parts of the Alas-
kan OCS described by the MMS as being "tentative." '495 In addition to
the frontier exploration sales, the proposed five-year program includes an
accelerated sales procedure for certain lucrative areas.4 96 The supple-
mental sales, to be held yearly, are designed to give industry a chance to
bid on selected drainage and development tracts, and on tracts which
have been the subject of previously rejected bids.
If implemented, the new five-year program would constitute a con-
siderable reduction in the pace of OCS leasing. The reasons for this re-
duction are twofold. First, the price of oil has continued to decline and
seems unlikely to rise sharply during the remainder of 1985 and early
1986. Second, the Congress is expected to continue its anti-offshore de-
velopment stance at least until the next congressional elections and prob-
ably until the end of President Reagan's second administration. As
noted previously,4 97 about forty-five million acres situated off the shores
of California and Massachusetts were excluded from oil and gas leasing




497. See supra notes 450-51 and accompanying text.
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